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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF R. Daniel McCauley for the 
Master of Arts in History presented December 4, 1985. 
Title: Wilhelm Reich's Character Analysis in its Historical 
Context. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Go(°.j~ Dodds 
The thesis is an attempt to reconcile contradictions 
and devise historical meaning from a problematic text. The 
book is Wilhelm Reich's Character Analysis, first published 
in 1933. This influential psychoanalytic work embodies both 
a radical social theory and disturbing authoritarian 
attitudes. The thesis uses a variety of methodologies, in 
particular Roland Barthes' techniques for ascribing 
historical meaning to certain formal qualities of writing. 
The thesis proceeds from a summary of methodological studies 
in intellectual history and criticism, including those of I. 
A. Richards, R. G. Collingwood, and Dominick LaCapra, as 
well as Barthes, to a description of Character Analysis and 
its various historical contexts - biographical, social, and 
intellectual. The thesis relies on the authoritative 
biography of Reich, by Myron Scharaf, on autobiographical 
accounts by Reich's wife and son, on other texts in 
psychoanalytic social theory by Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, 
Herbert Marcuse, Georges Bataille, and Max Horkheimer, and 
on secondary scholarship on the origins of National 
Socialist ideology. The thesis argues that despite the 
influence of reactionary tendencies in Reich's personality 
and cultural and social milieu, Character Analysis remains a 
valuable work in the development of a convincing theory of 
liberation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay is an exercise in eliciting meaning from a 
text. The book is Character Analysis, written by Wilhelm 
Reich over the years 1925 to 1948. It is a classic of depth 
psychology and radical social theory. The significance of 
Reich's work lies in his advancing a conception of mind 
which subsumes both physiological processes and social life 
into an integrated theory of reason1 and which also 
reconciles the complex, contestatory discourses of 
psychoanalysis and communism. It is a theory in the process 
of development, and the text reflects this. A fragment, 
describing a decade of clinical work and political activity, 
was first published by Sexpol-Verlag in Berlin in 1933 as 
Characteranalyse. The final expanded edition appeared in 
New York in English in 1949. This contains clarifications 
in the forms of notes, reminiscences, polemics, new clinical 
studies, and innovations in terminology. 
I have chosen to discuss this particular book not only 
because of its philosophical significance, but also its 
affect. It is moving and convincing in peculiar ways. 
First, Reich has written Character Analysis with a 
passionate commitment to rationality1 and he has applied 
2 
this to unmasking a compelling mystery - the 
interrelationship among sexual repression, sadomasochism, 
madness, and unfreedom. Also, in the course of his 
argument, he often surprises, disorients, and presents 
problems to the reader. This is partly due to the author's 
implicating diverse types of writing and intentions. 
Formally, Character Analysis is at once a wide-ranging 
theory and a pastiche; so shocks and disjunctures appear in 
the course of the text. For example, Reich's basic concern 
is to encourage psychoanalysts to adopt a controversial 
technique; this is to attack at a certain point in therapy 
not the words and the memories their patients carry of the 
past, but their present demeanor, manners, physical bearing, 
their very bodies, and, above all, their sexual abstinence. 
And he pursues what appears to be a strictly scientific 
argument here. But this rigorous discourse opens onto an 
intensely dramatic and personal narrative - the case study 
of his attempt to cure a young shizophrenic; at other 
moments onto an utopian communique - a metapsychological 
prescription against oppression and conflict; and even onto 
an image of transcendence - of the structure and purpose of 
the cosmos. Another aspect of the strange appeal of this 
text is its luridness. At its center, Reich has placed a 
complex of assertions about sexual orgasm, which includes 
such relatively inappropriate statements as clinical 
descriptions, boasts and confessions, idealizations, and 
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dicta for politically correct sex acts. On occasion, these 
seem to the reader attempts to map out a strategy for the 
scientific and ideological domination of the most private 
behavior. Reich also writes in Character Analysis with a 
generous respect for the experiences and opinions of 
psychotics7 indeed, he has the disturbing knack to bring 
both himself and his reader into collusion with his 
patients' madness. And finally, the argument of Character 
Analysis comes to seem to this reader quite fantastic, while 
still maintaining its conviction and importance. The text 
is writing that, by its virtues, its rigor, universality, 
ambition, and radicalness, is at once self-destructive and 
liberating. All these are compelling reasons for examining 
and amplifying Reich's text in an effort to understand it. 
I hope to elucidate these aspects of Character 
Analysis by situating the book historically. This is only 
indirectly an attempt to trace the influences on the text, 
its intellectual and social determinants, or its general 
impact. Instead, I want to attempt a more limited, perhaps 
personal, kind of historical understanding of Character 
Analysis by comparing similarities and differences between 
it and analogous pieces of writing. I have selected these 
additional texts also for their personal affect, as well as 
for their common concerns, modes of expression, and 
relationship in time to Character Analysis. They include, 
for example, Max Horkheimer's Eclipse of Reason, which 
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parallels Reich's effort to understand the political and 
social crises of the twentieth century from a psychoanalytic 
perspective; Reich's own ~ Psychology .Qf Fascism, which 
was written concurrently with Character Analysis and 
clarifies the sociological and political aspects of his 
work; and Ilse Ollendorff Reich's biography, which documents 
her husband's experiences and intentions. 
This comparison of texts will hopefully evoke meaning 
because they share a climate of opinion, a world-view. They 
are bound together by their relationship in time as well as 
their similar concerns into a field of discourse. These 
other writings compose a temporally illumined scheme of 
contexts within which Character Analysis might be placed. 
This scheme includes one context made up of statements about 
Reich's experiences and intentions; another of statements 
that can be arranged into the tradition of discourse within 
which Reich wrote, which includes the psychoanalytic and 
Marxist critiques of fascism; and one of statements which 
impinge referentially or instrumentally upon common 
institutions, political events, and other facts of social 
life. The historical meaning of Character Analysis resides 
where it and these contexts intersect. 
But gaps, disjunctures, both in Reich's writing and 
this field of discourse, are also meaningful. The variety 
of critical perspectives on fascism creates an often 
conflicting textual milieu. And as far as texts refer to 
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moments outside themselves, to events and institutions that 
have concrete existence, these exist and endure, and also 
change and disappear within any historical period. So some 
possibilities for meaning, certain relationships between 
statements, are complex and fractured. Horkheimer's 
discussion of the relationship between psychological needs, 
reason, and forms of political domination made different 
sense in 1947, after the war against fascism, than Reich's 
in 1934, in the midst of revolution. They take on still 
additional significance from the perspective of the present 
-while for two decades unrestrained narcissism has been a 
practical form of resistance to racism, militarism, and the 
fragmentation of love into commodity relationships. Of 
course, both writers' statements still connect with one 
another. They are part of a continuing radical discourse 
about reason, society, and human nature. Also, Character 
Analysis was written in confrontation to other texts and 
real events. It was the culmination of disputes with both 
psychoanalysts and socialists. And finally, Reich wrote it 
with instrumental intent - to make things happen in the 
world, sometimes fantastic, utopian, absurd things, 
absolutely contrary to the commonplace sense of reality. He 
attempted to argue the world he desired into being. This 
tends to appear to the reader as the criticism of many 
political, psychoanalytic, and scientific ideas as forms of 
domination. Consequently, these gaps, extensions, open 
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spaces in the field of textual statements have meaning as 
potential sites of empowerment. In his text, Reich seizes 
upon contradictions, whether between Marxist and Freudian 
theory and practice, between basic human needs and the 
experience of living in Central Europe in the 1930's, 
between reason and conventional constraints, within bodies 
which function against themselves, or within a madness that 
makes sense, as opportunities for liberation, for 
dispersions and redistributions of power. And this, too, is 
historically meaningful. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Before proceeding to describe Character Analysis more 
closely, I want to review some current opinions on the 
status of the methodology of the history of ideas and the 
criticism of significant texts, and clarify what I intend by 
historical meaning. For I am using a number of disparate 
notions from twentieth century writers, from R. G. 
Collingwood to Roland Barthes, as well as Reich's own sense 
of the relationship among mind, memory, the past, and 
present concerns. These various notions do share, however, 
a conviction about the extent to which historical thinking 
is autonomous. It is a kind of fiction or poetics that is 
made meaningful by the historian's imaginative power. This 
includes her or his abilities to enclose the past in its 
relevance or its distance, to invest the present with 
qualities of mind, and to visualize the future with hope. 
History is, at least in part, determined by the status of 
the historian as his own subject. 
For example, Collingwood argues in ~ ~ .Q.f History 
that any intellectual historian's knowledge of the past is 
necessarily based on an assumption about the unity of human 
thought. This concept is an ancient and pervasive one. 
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Collingwood translates its classical formulation into terms 
of the logical dependence of present mental acts on previous 
ones, of a chain of ideation through time. 
Ever since Plato in the Timaeus said that time is the 
moving image of eternity, philosophers have for the most 
part agreed that there was sane relation between [time and 
reason and the] necessary sequence by which cne thing leads 
to another in a nm-temporal logical series. If this is 
denied, and if it is maintained that temporal sequence and 
logical implication have nothing to do with each other, 
historical knowledge becanes inpossible, for it follows 
that we can never say about any event "this ~ have 
happened"; the past can never a~r as the ccnclusion of a 
logical inference. If the temporal series is a mere 
aggregate of disconnected events, we can never argue back 
from the present to the past. But historical thinking 
consists precisely of arguing back in this way; and it is 
therefore based on the assumpticn that there is an internal 
or necessary connecticn between the events of a time-series 
such that ooe event leads necessarily to another and we can 
argue back from the seccnd to the first. en this principle 
there is only cne way in which the present state of things 
can have cane into existence, and history is the analysis 
of the present in order to see what this process must have 
been.I 
With Collingwood, historical thinking is validated on a 
similar, but somewhat more limited, logical basis. For the 
historian, the ~resent shares an identity with the past as 
the certain sum or composite of a continuum of moments, but 
distilled to acts of pure mind. Collingwood proceeds to 
acknowledge favorably the view of his contemporary, the 
political theorist Michael Oakeshott, that historical 
thinking is thus "a perfectly genuine experience." What the 
historian 
Is experiencing is going en in his mind now; in so far as 
he places it, as it were, at arm's length fran him in the 
past, he is misconceiving it; he is arranging in imaginary 
pigeon-holes of past time what is actually all present and 
not past at all. And this does not imply that he is making 
historical mistakes about the past. There is no past, 
except for a person involved in the historical roode of 
experience7 and for him the past is what he carefully and 
critically thinks it to be. He makes no mistake gya 
historian: the only mistake he makes is the philosophical 
mistake of arranging in the past what is actually all 
present experience •••• 
[This] entirely vindicates the autonOII¥ of historical 
thought. The historian is master in his own house7 he owes 
nothing to the scientist or to anyone, else. And this house 
is not built and furnished out of mere ideas of his own 
which may or may not correspond with the ideas of other 
historians or with the real past which they are all alike 
trying to know7 it is a house inhabited by all historians, 
and it consists not of ideas about hi.story, but of history 
itself.2 
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History, then, is radically contemporary7 it is created7 it 
is always what the historian makes it1 and it is meaningful 
in the sense it shares a continuously renewed identity with 
all acts of mind. 
Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has daie 
in the past, and at the same time :Lt is the redoing of 
this, the perpetuation of past acts in the present. Its 
object is therefore not a mere object, sanething outside 
the mird which knais it7 it is an activity of thought, 
which can be known only in so far as the knowing mind re-
enacts it and knows itself as so doing. To the historian, 
the activities whose history he ls studying are not 
spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived 
through in his mind7 they are object:lve, or known to him, 
only because they are also subjective,. or activities of his 
own.3 
Collingwood' s view tends to minimiz1e the factness of the 
past. History is possible as the sympathetic repetition of 
thought events. It is imbued with meaning by the unity of 
reason, by a basic identity of human thought throughout 
time. But it is primarily an act of imagination, performed 
with presence and presentness of mind. 
These dicta on the logic of historical thinking are 
10 
related to one significant aspect of what has most commonly 
been written in this century as the history of ideas. The 
typical intellectual historian constructs a line of 
development through past facts and ideas toward some more 
contemporary and relevant theory, viewpoint, or taste. 
Rudolph H. Weingartner clarifies this tradition in "Some 
Philosophic Comments on Cultural Hif:~tory." Weingartner has 
chosen "fairly arbitrarily" thn:~e texts: Edwin E. 
Lowinsky, "Awareness of Tonality in the Sixteenth Century•, 
1961; Herbert Butterfield, "The History of the Modern Theory 
of Gravitation•, 1952; and Arthur o. Lovejoy, "The First 
Gothic Revival and the Return to Nature", 1932. He 
summarizes "the historical substance" of each of these 
briefly. He then proceeds "to discuss the nature of the 
subject matter of each of the samples", "to focus on the 
types of connection said by [these] historians to hold among 
the different elements of their subject matter•, and to 
"take up the problems of causality and influence in cultural 
and intellectual history.•4 
His basic observation of the subject matter of these 
texts is that they are only minimally concerned with 
ordinary actions or events, but instead with what the 
products of various kinds of intellectual activity look 
like; that is, they are concerned with similarities and 
differences among ideas. These histi:>r ical accounts do not 
touch upon the usual concomitants of activity - neither 
individual motives, 
professional life. 
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psychology, and aims, nor daily and 
Weingartner suggests that such 
disinterest by these writers in character and the conditions 
of work, but exclusive emphasis on formal descriptions of 
certain special features of the works themselves, indicate 
an unusual view of causality. 
The formal relationships these intellectual historians 
describe among various ideas are complex. But they are all 
viewed from the standpoint of the present. Both Butterfield 
and Lowinsky are interested in abstract conceptions that 
predate and resemble certain currently admired ideas, 
specifically, Newton's cosmology and the tonalities of the 
classical canon from Bach to Beethoven. Lovejoy selects 
statements about design and nature that compose a unified 
correct taste. And he proceeds to describe a relationship 
between a change in taste and a change in the meaning of the 
concept of nature. Lowinsky describes an advance in musical 
composition in the sixteenth century, an increase in the 
number and complexity of triadic hc:Lrmonies over time. He 
also categorizes these formal elements against those of 
another competing development of chi:omaticism. Butterfield 
describes how the work of a century of individual scientists 
provided a variety of propositions and methods that Newton 
was able to select out and bring together into a universal 
theory of matter and motion. 
Weingartner insists that the historians cannot mean 
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these relationships among the formal aspects of individual 
intellectuals' works to be causal in the ordinary sense. He 
points out that causal arguments of the type of a chain of 
multiple events subsequent to one another are rare and 
dubious. 
The world is not made in a way suitable for the isolation 
of causal chains. Because too many things exercise causal 
influence on other things, the accounting for an occurence 
(E) by reference to a causal chain (back to A) will in most 
cases seem arbitrary and unilluminat:Lng. In so far as it 
is furthermore implied that E is the product onl_y of D and 
D of C (and so on), the account is simply false.s-
Also, causality is extremely dif:Eicult to prove and 
inappropriate for describing groups of artists and 
scientists. 
Coomunities of this kind do not consis:t simply of works and 
workers, but inclooe at least such :institutions in which 
artists or scientists are trained and those by which their 
works are used in various way. • • • .Anyone who takes the 
problem of influence seriously has a difficult task to 
perform. It is hard work to establish a claim to the 
effect that sane feature of a work is the product of an 
influence of an earlier work having a certain feature. It 
has to be shown that the author of the later work was 
indeed familiar with the earlier, that he noted in sane 
appropriate way the relevent feature, that he was not also 
familiar with sane third work possessing sane other 
feature, or at least that his own work was not produced 
under the influence of such a third work, that he did not 
cane to give to his work the feature that he did 
independently of any previous works, and probably quite a 
bit more.6 
Weingartner asserts, rather, that works in 
intellectual history have an interest and meaning regardless 
of the problem of causality. 
We share with the authors of these essays an interest that 
is .m.U. geoeris, one that is satisfied in knowing what the 
stages were in the develcpnent of a carq;>lex feature. We 
are quite content to ignore or take up at another time the 
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questicn of what brought it about.7 
It seems, also, that this interest is similar to the 
imaginative acts of history-making that Collingwood 
describes. The connection among a variety of musical forms 
over time or among different conceptions of mechanics, 
divested on contingent, factual causes, suggests that 
logical sequence of ideations through time which the 
historian recreates from his standpoint solidly in the 
present. 
This distinction between causation and a logic 
appropriate to historical thinking is further elaborated by 
w. H. Walsh in his essay "The Causation of Ideas." Walsh 
observes that it is the usual business of historians to take 
ideas at more than their face valuE~, to "see them not as 
self-subsistent entities, but as effects which bear witness 
to their causes and deserve attention just because of that 
fact. 11 8 And as with Weingartner, the precise nature of this 
relationship concerns him. It is not causation in what he 
calls the Humean sense - as "two items which are separately 
describable and in which instances of the first sort are 
found in constant conjunction with instances of the 
second.•9 
But certain other, less precis:e, relations involving 
ideas are meaningful. For example, historians often discuss 
ideas as related to unspoken assumptions, to a climate of 
ideas. Clearly, this includes the relationship among ideas 
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within a common period of time. In this kind of argument, 
historians demonstrate that 
Saneone who believed R could not do so unless he also 
believed g, and then sh<M that thei~e is good reason to 
suppose that he did believe g, or took it silently for 
granted. Fundamentally, what is i.n question here is 
logical argument rather than causal reason.. • • The climate 
of ideas in which they move cert:ainly affects men's 
thoughts, but not as an independent causal agent. It is 
better described as informing their thoughts •••• Reference 
to it is enlightening because it calstitutes the standing 
background of assumptions against which particular ideas 
were formed.le 
Walsh goes on to argue that what intellectual 
historians might seem to consider causes of ideas outside 
the sphere of ideas - for example, social, economic, or 
political forces - are, in fact, not. They are at base 
relations of thought of the same type as that between an 
idea and its intellectual climate. Material and social 
situations do not affect ideas in and of themselves, but are 
mediated by the thinking individuals' perceptions of these 
situations1 and such perceptions involve options, 
possibilities. Consequently, "the f<>rming of the idea is 
not a mechanical effect of the envisaging of a situation, 
but rather an appropriate response to it.•ll 
Quentin Skinner, in "Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas", turns this kind of connection into a 
thoroughgoing critique of the met:hods of intellectual 
historians. For Skinner, historical meaning emerges from 
the diversity among ideas and contexts over time. 
It is the vecy fact that the classic:: texts are concerned 
with their own quite alien prd:>lems, and not the 
presumpticn that they are somehow concerned with our own 
problems as well, which seems to me to give not the lie but 
the key to the indispensable value o.f studying the history 
of ideas. The classic texts, eJcpecially in social, 
ethical, and political thought, help to reveal - if we let 
them - not the essential sameness, but rather the essential 
variety of viable moral assumptions and political 
camdtments. It is in this, moreover., that their essential 
philosophical, even moral, value can be seen to lie.12 
15 
Skinner's essay is a series of cautions against presentism, 
what he considers an unhistorical, fallacious, banal mode of 
thinking. These include contaminati·on "by the unconscious 
application of paradigms whose familiarity to the historian 
disguises an essential inapplicability to the past"; "sheer 
anachronism•, whereby •a given writer may be 'discovered' to 
have held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity 
of terminology, on some subject which he cannot in principle 
have meant to contribute"; the "mythology of doctrines" -
mistaking "some scattered or incidental remarks by one of 
the classic theorists for his 'doc:trine' on one of the 
themes the historian is set to expec:t•; and the "danger of 
the historian conceiving his task to be to supply or find in 
the text a coherence they may seem to lack." "This whole 
repertoire of Einfluss-studies is based on nothing better 
than the capacity of the observer to foreshorten the past by 
filling it with his own reminiscences. •13 Skinner's 
alternative view of intellectual history is of a discipline 
which restricts its meaning to delineating the intentions of 
textual statements possible within the precise time of their 
production. 
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Skinner's essay has engendered a recent controversy in 
methodology. For example, Joseph V. Femia, in "An 
Historicist Critique of 'Revisionist' Methods for Studying 
the History of Ideas", has ascribed to Skinner a series of 
propositions which he considers mostly dubious: 
(i) In the sphere of political/social reality, there are no 
universal truths or perermial questioos; all systems of 
ideas correspood to specific phr.ases and orders of 
experience; (ii) past thought must bE! c00q;>letely dissolved 
into its precise context (culture, situation, and so 
forth); it possesses no capacity for independent life; 
(iii) the intellectual historian should not concern himself 
with the validity or present signif:Lcance of past ideas; 
texts must not be regarded as vehiclE!S for the exercise of 
the analyst's own preoccupations; (iv') historicity demands 
that we focus on what an author co:nsciously intended to 
say; and (v) no subsequent account of a thinker's 
enterprise could survive the demonstration that it is 
itself dependent on the use of anachronistic criteria of 
descriptiai and classification - criteria which, in other 
terms, would have been unintellig:Lble to the thinker 
himself .14 
Femia suggests that Skinner's proposition (i) is something 
of an historiographical commonplace. The others are a 
misusing of Husserl. He proposes, in turn: 
(a) Ideas nay enshrine much that is1 of pernanent value, 
even though they themselves are untrue or obsolete; b) 
thinkers do indeed work within intellectual traditions, 
which - to ~ extent transcend particular contexts; (c) 
all history is "caitemporary histoi:y", dictated by the 
interests of the historian; study of the past is valuable 
only insofar as it throws light on. present proolems or 
needs; (d) it is neither necessary ncJr desirable, fran an 
historicist perspective, to understand a body of thought 
µ.irely or even primarily in terms of t:he author's conscious 
designs.15 
Femia argues that some problems and questions recur in 
the history of ideas due to the exi,stence of a "permanent 
substratum of all philosophizing", or human nature.16 In 
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addition, •particular authors usually think and write in a 
way that they regard as relevant to what their predecessors 
wrote.•17 To whatever extent any text is determined by the 
time and place and social situation of authorship, an 
ahistorical, individual element is nevertheless present as a 
residue, transcending contemporary conditions of life. 
These include ideals and values th.at are useful in new 
contexts. Finally, reflection on the act of writing as 
cognition and creation reveals how this can be so, how texts 
involve more than intention and context, and why their 
reconstruction is meaningful. 
Although an idea is the product of the thinking which went 
into it, it also transcends that thinking. There may be 
logical relations between a person's ideas which do not 
correspald to any psychological rEuations between the 
thought processes which led respect~rely to those ideas -
logical relations of which he may be tmaware.18 
Dominick LaCapra, in "Rethinking Intellectual History 
and Reading Texts•, argues a carefully modulated criticism 
of Skinner, who holds what he terms a documentary view of 
historical thinking. The documentary includes the facts of 
the text, its literal assertions; it also refers to the 
, relationship of the text to empirical reality. LaCapra 
suggests that the writing of the his:tory of ideas is more 
than this; it is •a subtle interplay between proximity and 
distance in the historian's relation to the 'object• of 
study.• Texts hold within themselves the totality of 
history. They are 
A situated use of language marked by a tense interactiai 
~-
between mutually implicated yet contestatory tendencies. 
en this view' the very awositicn between what is inside 
and what is outside texts is rendered prcblematic, and 
nothing is seen as being purely inside or outside texts. 
Indeed, the problem then becomes cne of rethinking the 
ccncepts of "inside" and "outside" in relaticn to processes 
of interaction between language and the world •••• For the 
historian, the very recoostructioo of a "context• or a 
"reality• takes place on the basis of "textualized" 
remainders of the past.19 
18 
In short, the intellectual historian never simply confronts 
the past, the context and intentions of a great piece of 
writing, as a pure object, something to be discovered, 
observed, and reconstructed. Rather, he or she is always 
engaged with the text, a very part of it, within a process 
of discourse. Also, interesting texts are resistant to the 
kind of historical reconstruction Skinner advocates by 
virtue of their uncommonness, "the exceptional way in which 
they address commonplace themes", in which they •engage in 
processes that employ or ref er to ordinary asssumptions and 
contest them.•20 This applies not only to the ordinary 
notions of the time within which a text was created, but 
also the tradition. LaCapra names this conception of texts 
the work-like. "The work-like supplements empirical reality 
by adding to, and subtracting from, it.• It includes "the 
roles of commitment, interpretation, and imagination•1 and 
it •engages the reader in re-creative dialogue with the text 
and the problems it raises.•21 The work-like aspects of the 
text also engage the historian in attempting 
To think further what is at issue in a text or a past 
"reality•, and in the process the questioner is himself 
questicned by the "other.• His own horizoo is transformed 
as he coofronts still living (but often submerged or 
silenced) possibilities solicited by an ilquiry into the 
past.22 
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LaCapra proceeds to name and describe six different 
contexts within which a piece of writing is situated. It is 
the intellectual historian's task both to document and to 
work at the tensions within these, and their relative 
importance. The first context LaCapra discusses is ·~ 
relation between ~ author'~ intentions .Sl.Wi ~ text.• He 
objects that Skinner's view of this •tends to assume a 
proprietary relation between the author and the text as well 
as a unitary meaning for an utterance.•23 Historical 
analysis might go beyond this to discuss multiple 
intentions, contradictions, or ambivalence on the author's 
part. This comes out of a sense of writing as the process 
of creating out of experience - which is polymorphous - both 
latent and surface meanings. Skinner's prescription also 
ignores the possibility of a community of discourse around 
the text, the extent to which the author's intention is only 
one among all those who have commented or reflected upon it. 
That is, it discounts the aura of the text; it limits the 
power of readers to respond to a text, enrich it, and create 
an extended tradition. 
Second, is 9 The relation between ~ author'~ l.i.f..e. .s.rui 
~ ~.•24 LaCapra warns that this is not merely an 
analogous relationship, in which aspects of life and writing 
directly reflect one another; rather, these might •be worked 
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or played out differently in each, and these differential 
relations pose important problems for interpretation.• 
Also, writing is not merely imitation, but also 
supplementing, an over-abundance. Texts "add something to 
the ordinary life that as a matter of (perhaps unfortunate) 
fact might not exist without them. 11 25 
Third, is "~ relation .Qf society to texts.•26 
Again, this is not merely a matter of analogy. It is 
That of now precisely the discursive practice, deep 
structure, or ideology - even the prejudice - is situated 
in the text other than in terms of instantiation or simple 
reflection.27 
Those aspects of the text that are conditioned by the 
specific time of its composition intersect those that are 
common to a long tradition and those that are special 
moments of originality. These new moments represent in a 
complex text the interplay between aspects that are 
escapist, "imaginary compensation for the defects of 
material reality•, and those that serve •the contestatory 
function of questioning the empirical in a manner that has 
broader implications (prescriptions) for the leading of 
life. 11 28 
Fourth, is "~relation of culture to texts.•29 
It is not enough to establish influence or the existence of 
a shared "paradigm" through the enl.lllleratioo of carmcn 
presUtp)Sitions, questions, themes, or arguments. One must 
elucidate in a more precise and detailed way how the 
borrowed or the ccmncn actually functions in the texts in 
question.30 
Fifth, is ·~ relation Qf s llxt .t.Q .the. corpus Q.f A 
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writer. •31 LaCapra warns that discontinuities in the body 
of work of a writer might be intentional, explicit 
explorations, self-criticisms, or ironies by the writer 
himself. Finally, is ·~ relation between modes .Q.f 
discourse and texts. •32 Here, La Capra is concerned with 
self-referential aspects of a text, those statements which 
concern the text's own mode of production. These include 
formal qualities of the writing, as well as restrictions and 
rules for proper statements. The historian needs to 
determine how the canons for purity are established, and 
what contradictions or tensions are excluded or suppressed 
by such rules. 
This concept of the rules of discourse points to a 
special view of historical thinking, one that is in respects 
more radically critical than Skinner's, that reduces the 
logical interrelationship of facts and ideas through time to 
a mere convention, and which has been taken by French 
structuralists. In a discussion of this tradition, 
•structuralism and the Writing of Intellectual History•, 
Sande Cohen asserts that historical statements are 
conventional and hypostatic. Chronology merely 
sustains all other levels of historical discourse, 
including descriptioos, assertioos, naming of cootiguities 
between facts, elenents of sequence and simultaneity, the 
search for discontinuities between perioas.33 
Yet the chronological relationship of events is in itself 
empty of any concrete meaning. That B followed A in time 
does not explain anything about either A or B. 
Historians 'touch' the objects of their discourse only by 
recourse to the already-meant; hence, every shred of 
historical meaning belongs to the discourse and not to the 
objects.34 
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This hypostasis is related to the function of historical 
statements as instruments of persuasion, instruction, and 
domination. Code and convention function to restrict the 
domain of appropriate statements and enforce particular 
thoughts, feelings, and values. This view opens up a new 
range of historical inquiry. 
In place of asking •what did that mean?•, an historian can 
ask •how did a past generate a plethora of significations 
which historians can choose for historical remenbrance?• 
This shift entails that just as one •denaturalizes• 
historical discourse by trying to write without benefit of 
conventional meanings, one must •denaturalize• historical 
objects and model them as past productions of sense which 
becane conventions in historical time and entered into a 
host of differing intellectual functions.35 
Such rules, constraints, conventions exist as meaningful 
residues in any system of discourse and in any text. The 
structuralist prescription for the intellectual historian, 
then, is to delineate the rules by which a text makes sense 
and how these came to be used as instruments of domination. 
The structuralist tactic for analyzing texts is 
linguistic specifically, the use of the sentence as a basic 
model for both texts and non-verbal events. This model 
suggests two kinds of relations in any system of meaning. 
In addition to the rules or conventions by which meaningful 
relationships are constructed, there is the world-view 
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within which an audience perceives statements, texts, and 
events. The first limits the domain of allowable 
operations, combinations, analogies; the second defines the 
field of •interpretable meanings and connotations.•36 
Consequently, the object of analysis is not so much the 
content, but how the making of sense happens by means of the 
text. This occurs as a saturation, an interpenetration of 
form, assumptions, and statements, both within the text and 
among other texts and events in the social world. 
Perhaps the most important figure in this tradition is 
Roland Barthes. His literary criticism emphasizes 
historical residues of form that express negation, those 
aspects of a text that defy commonplace notions, crude 
conventions of domination, and instead release fantasy and 
dreams of liberation. For example, in Writing Degree ~' 
Barthes attempts to describe certain self-conscious aspects 
of modern literature, which appear only to refer to the 
writing itself, but which actually reveal writing as an 
alienated activity, and which thus contain an implicit 
critique of bourgeois social relations. 
It is impossible to write without labelling oneself •••• 
[Literature] must signify something other than its content 
and its individual form, something which defines its limits 
and ~s it as Literature, whence a set of signs 
unrelated to the ideas, the language or the style, and 
setting out to give definition, within the body of every 
possible mode of expressioo, to the utter separateness of a 
ritual language. This hieratic quality of written signs 
establishes Literature as an institution and clearly tends 
to place it above history, for no limits can be set without 
some idea of permanence. N<M it is when History is denied 
that it is most unmistakably at work; it is therefore 
possible to trace a history of literary expressicn which is 
neither that of a particular language, nor that of the 
various styles, but simply that of the signs of Literature, 
and we can expect that this µirely formal history may 
manifest, in its far from obscure way, a link with the 
deeper levels of history.37 
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Although the self-referring moments of literature are the 
most transparent, others - the interstices of structural, 
general limits to writing - also signify alienation and 
liberation. Barthes names these limits as language, style, 
and mode. Language is the compendium of rules and practices 
which the writers of a particular historical period share. 
It is the boundary within which written statements must 
remain in order to make sense. 
SUspended between forms either disused or as yet unknown, 
the writer's language is not so much a fund to be drawn on 
as an extreme limit; it is the geometrical locus of all 
that he could not say without, like Orpheus looking back, 
losing the stable meaning of his enterprise and his 
essential gesture as a social being.38 
Style is the personal, idiosyncratic, almost physiological 
aspect of writing. 
[Its] imagery, delivery, vocabulary spring from the body 
and the past of the writer ard gradually becane the very 
reflexes of his art.... Its frame of reference is 
biological, not historical: it is the writer's "thing", 
his glory, and his priscn, it is his solitude, indifferent 
to society and transparent to it, a closed perscnal 
process, it is in no way the product of a choice or of a 
reflecticn on Literature. It is the private portion of the 
ritual. It rises up from the writer's ~laden depths 
and unfolds beyond his area of control. It is the 
decorative voice of hidden, secret flesh; it works as does 
Necessity, as if, in this kind of floral growth, style were 
no more than the outcane of a blind and stubborn 
metamorphosis starting fran a sub-language elaborated where 
flesh and external reality come together.39 
Mode describes the temporally limited choice a writer makes 
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among intentions, ethics, political commitments, naturalness 
of expression, and other considerations •of the social use 
which he has chosen for his form•. 
Thus the choice of, and afterwards the responsibility for, 
a mode of writing i:x>int to the presence of Freedom, but 
this Freedom has not the same limits at different nanents 
of History. It is not granted to the writer to choose his 
mode of writing fran a kim of non-tenp:>ral store of 
literary forms. It is under the pressure of History and 
Traditiai that the possible modes of writing for a given 
writer are established; there is a History of writing. But 
this History is dual: at the very manent when general 
History proposes - or imposes - new problematics of the 
literary language, writing still remains full of the 
recollection of previous usage, for language is 
never innocent: words have a second-order memory which 
mysteriously persists in the midst of new meanings. 
Writing is precisely this carpranise between freedan and 
rement>rance, it is this freedan which remerrbers and is free 
only in the gesture of choice, but is no laiger so within 
duration. True, I can today select such and such a mode of 
writing, and in so doing assert my freedan, aspire to the 
freshness of novelty or to a tradition; but it is 
impossible to devel~ it within duration without gradually 
becaning a prisoner of someone else's words and even my 
own. A stubborn after-image, which canes from all the 
previous nodes of writing and even fran the past of my own, 
drowns the sound of my present words. my written trace 
precipitates, as inside a chemical at first transparent, 
innocent, and neutral, mere duratiai gradually reveals in 
suspension a whole past of increasing density, like a 
cryptogram. 
Writing as Freedan is therefore a mere manent. But 
this manent is one of the most explicit in History. Since 
History is always and above all a choice and the limits of 
this choice.40 
One mode in Barthes' history of writing is important, here. 
This is Marxist writing, wherein the choice of a 
specialized, technical vocabulary attempts to define an 
enclosed, totally natural world. This vocabulary has the 
effect of imposing •a stability in its explanations and a 
permanence in its method•, as well as always expressing a 
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consistent set of value-judgements.41 But this closure also 
binds it to a specific praxis, which is, •in the present 
state of History•, one of domination1 and like "any 
political mode of writing can only uphold a police world.•42 
This contradiction points to the basic dilemma of writing in 
the present era. The potentiality of writing as freedom, as 
an absolutely good moral choice, is restricted by the 
present social reality and the structural limits of writing 
itself. 
Within the dynamic of writing as freedom and 
constraint, certain formal properties of the text, its 
subversive moments, are especially meaningful. One of these 
is its fugue-like nature, which Barthes elaborates in his 
essay "From Work to Text.• A meaningful text defies 
classification. It represents, instead, •a serial movement 
of disconnections, overlappings, variations•, which 
"coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy. •43 That 
is, elements of the text, whether of form or content, are 
interwoven in such a unique way, they throw the reader into 
a special state of confusion, back upon his or her own 
psychic resources. It requires the reader to enter into the 
actual construction of the text. so it is, on a deep and 
cooperative basis, an empowering of the reader. 
'Ihls means that the Text requires that ooe try to abolish 
(or at the very least to diminish) the distance between 
writing and reading, in no way by intensifying the 
projectioo of the reader into the work, but by joining them 
in a single signifying practice.44 
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In The Pleasure Qf .tM .l'..llt., Barthes further 
elaborates this psychology of reading - not as cognition, 
but as erotic liberation. This is achieved by what he terms 
the redistribution of language. 
Such redistributioo is always achieved by cutting. '!Wo 
edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing 
edge (the language is to be copied in its canonical state, 
as it has been established by schooling, good usage, 
literature, culture), and another edge, mobile, blank ready 
to assurre any contours), which is never anything but the 
site of its effect: the place where the death of language 
is gl~. These two edges, the conpromise they bring 
about, are necessary. Neither culture nor its destructioo 
is erotic7 it is the seam between them, the fault, the 
flow, which becanes so.45 
Characteristics of this cutting edge of the text include 
shocks, excesses, disturbances, the loss which is proper 
to ecstacy, the split that is an overcoming of "the moral 
unity that society demands of every human product", 
extravagant originality or repetition, uncompleted 
statements which avoid being ideological by leaving the 
reader hanging, a "subtle subversion, what is not directly 
concerned with destruction, evades the paradigm, and seeks 
some other term: a third term, which is not, however, a 
synthesizing term, but an extraordinary term", an 
interrelatedness, by which "reading and the risks of life 
are subject to the same anamnesis.•46 This is a 
psychoanalytic typology, "linking the reading neurosis to 
the hallucinated form of the text. •47 It is the 
encountering of the reader's individuality within the 
affects, frictions, and open spaces of the text. 
28 
In this regard, I want to note also I. A. Richards' 
Practical Criticism, a pioneering work in the problem of the 
relationship between a text and the variety of individual 
readings it might elicit. Richards' concern is primarily 
with developing a criteria for judging poetry. He 
approaches this by defining a typology of failures of 
intelligence and sensibility possible in a critical 
reading. 
'llle root question is whether responses reflect the poem 
itself, or sane private poem prompted by the material set 
before the reader and by his CMl'l reminiscences.48 
What are significant, here, are the categories of this 
typology, which, in a digression, Richards applies to any 
text, and particularly to texts of scientific discourse, 
such as Character Analysis. 
It is plain that most hlllllall utterances and nearly all 
articulate speech can be profitably regarded from four 
points of view. Four aspects can be easily distinguished. 
Let us call them Sense, Feeling, Tone, and Intention •••• 
If we survey our uses of language as a whole, it is 
clear that, at times, nCM one nCM another of the functions 
may become predominant. It will make the possible 
situations clearer if we briefly review certain typical 
forms of canposition. A man writing a scientific treatise, 
for example, will µit the sense of what he has to say 
first, he will subordinate his feelings about his subject 
or about other views upon it and be careful not to let them 
interfere to distort his argument or to suggest bias. His 
tone will be settled for him by academic convention7 he 
will, if he is wise, indicate respect for his readers and a 
moderate anxiety to be understood accurately and to win 
acceptance for his remarks. It will be well if his 
intention, as it shCMs itself in the work, be on the whole 
calfined to the clearest and most adequate statement of 
what he has to say. But, if the circlllllStances warrant it, 
further relevant aims - an intention to reorientate 
opinion, to direct attention to new aspects, or to 
encourage or discourage certain methods of work or ways of 
a~roach - are absolutely fitting •••• 
Consider now a writer engaged upon popularizing some 
of the results and hypotheses of science. The principles 
governing his language are not nearly so simple, for the 
furtherance of his intention will properly and inevitably 
interfere with the other functions. 
In the first place, precise and adequate statement of 
the sense may have to be sacrificed to some degree, in the 
interests of general intelligibility. Simplifications and 
distortions may be necessary if the reader is to "follow.• 
secondly, a much more lively exhibition of feelings on the 
part of the author towards his subject-matter is usually 
awropriate and desirable, in order to awaken and encourage 
the reader's interest. Thirdly, more variation between the 
expert and his lay audience must be created, and the task, 
as many specialists have discovered, is not easy. These 
other functions will interfere still more with strict 
accuracy of statement; and if the subject has a •tendency", 
if tx>litical, ethical, or theological implications are at 
all praninent, the intention of the work will have further 
opportunities to intervene.49 
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A correct reading or meaning happens by an 
analysis of how these characteristics are patterned 
throughout the text. Such an analysis is valuable to the 
extent it is integrated, reflecting an individual 
authenticity of experience. This is especially a problem 
with the category of feeling. 
If we canpare our IX7t1ers of analyzing sense and feeling we 
shall recognize at once that feeling, in contrast with 
sense, is a will-o'-the-wisp. we have a marvelous 
ag;>aratus of inter-engaging and overlawing synbols for 
handling and elucidating sense, a logical machine of great 
sensitiveness and IXJWer, equipped with autanatic safety 
devices and danger signals in the form of contradictions. 
Logical language has even reached such a high state of 
developnent that it can now be used to improve and extend 
itself, and may in time be made self-running and even fool-
proof. For handling feeling we have nothing at all 
canparable. we have to rely utx>n introspection, a few 
clumsy descriptive names for emotions, some scores of 
aesthetic adjectives and the indirect resources of tx>etry, 
resources at the diSIX>sal of a few men only, and for them 
only in exceptional hours. Introspection has become a 
byword, even where intellectual and sensory products and 
processes are concerned, but it is even more untrustworthy 
when a:g>lied to feelings. For a feeling even more than an 
idea or image tends to vanish as we turn our introspective 
attentiai upon it. we have to catch it by the tip of its 
tail as it decamps. Furthermore, even when we are 
partially successful in catching it, we do not yet know how 
to analyse it. Analysis is a matter of separating out its 
attributes, and no aie knows yet what attributes a feeling 
ma¥ have, what their system of interconnections is, or 
which are important, which trivia1.s0 
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An attempt at such an analysis of feeling has been 
made by the American literary critic Norman H. Holland, 
using the insights of depth psychology. For Holland, 
meaning emerges from the transformation of unconscious 
drives into conscious affects. This is a function of form. 
Writing and reading typically release erotic fantasies and 
guilt anxieties, as they simultaneously displace these to 
language and understanding, as defensive reactions. 
our caiscious attention shifts from the content of the 
utterance (which is presl.llllably sensual, and containing deep 
erotic associatiais, indeed well-spring) to its form. 
Attention, concern if you will, psychic energy, are taken 
away from substance and given to language.... such a 
displacement weakens our involvement with the deeper, 
fantasy levels, fraught with fear and desire1 fil_Stead, we 
concentrate our involvement on the verbal leve1.s 
The affective meaning of a text is a fugue, a movement along 
the range of discontinuities defined by fantasy content and 
literary form. 
I have gone into these notions of Barthes, Holland, 
and Richards about the nature of literary response to an 
extent perhaps inappropriate for understanding Character 
Analysis, a text of scientific prose. But in the course of 
discussing Character Analysis, a similar concept of the 
patterning of explicit, conscious, yet powerfully evocative 
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statements about sexual orgasm and repressed drives with an 
unusually wide variety of formal strategies, of 
distributions of language, for an expository text will 
hopefully help situate Reich's work within a general history 
of human liberation. 
I also want to note Hayden White's view of the status 
of historical statements. He asserts that history is made 
entirely of free creative choices1 it is iconic narrative, 
or poetry1 and its meaning is wholly contained within its 
mode of representation. White suggests a typology of form 
for history, by which a contextual methodology, which this 
essay will attempt to follow, implies a liberal ideology and 
an ironic world-view self-critical and ethically 
relativist. By this strategy, relationships between 
contexts are diverse and explainable functionally. So 
Character Analysis, in its conviction, its contradictions, 
its patterning of language, will be understood as providing 
a technique for hope, redress, and critique of the dominant 
social system. It will be explained as justification for 
certain decisions Reich made in his personal life, and as an 
instrument in his own psychic adjustment to reality. 
Generally, why events occurred 
Is to be explained by the revelation of the specific 
relationshiJ?S. they bore to other events occurring in their 
circumstantial historical space •••• In this operation the 
aim of explanation is to identify the "threads" that link 
the individual or institution [or work] under study to its 
specious sociocultural "present. 1152 
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It seems it is possible to hold an ironic viewpoint 
with rigor and critical self-consciousness, while 
questioning White's sense of an historical time as a purely 
imagined, specious object. Social processes might be real 
informants of a text. The world is certainly composed of 
made objects artifacts, institutions, and human 
relationships. Over time, men and women act cooperatively -
and, it would seem, both consciously and unconsciously - to 
change these. The production of a text belongs to the same 
historical process. It bears the marks not only of its 
individual creation and its general type, but also the 
special features of its time, the particular face presented 
by particular aggregates of men's and women's thought and 
activity. These represent autonomous choices. But they are 
also definable by their temporal unity. Character Analysis 
represents a singular act of writing: it is also 
classifiable as a narrative, a polemic, and a scientific 
argument. It is especially a chosen position - a critique 
of capitalism, politics, and sexual morality, but engaged 
with its own time. As such, it shares a particular social 
milieu and climate of opinion about reason, the human body, 
and freedom. Certainly, this is the view of historical 
meaning Reich himself expresses in Character Analysis. 
In his positicn as the object of his needs, h<Mever, man is 
also and at the same time the subject of history and of the 
social process of which he "himself is the author", not, to 
be sure, exactly as he would like to be, but under definite 
economic and cultural presuppositions, which determine the 
content and outcome of human action.53 
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All these features of Character Analysis meet in the 
formal qualities of the text - along the erotic edges of 
writing which Reich creates out of the aspirations, limits, 
and contradictions of his life and his age. And again, 
these consistently signify liberation. In short, I am using 
varied methodologies as tools for delineating a particular 
pattern by which Reich espouses freedom throughout Character 
Analysis. Following Richards and Holland, I am attempting 
to connect formal peculiarities of the text to my personal, 
emotional, even idiosyneratic responses in order to elicit 
an authentic, convincing reading. After Barthes, I am 
attempting to describe how certain of these literary 
characteristics might be historical evidence of the basic 
liberating value of Reich's writing. My use of Barthes is 
crucial. Whatever inconsistencies of authoritarian 
attitudes appear in Reich's text, my position is that these 
are overcome in the formal, liberating qualities of the 
work. Following Walsh, Femia, and LaCapra, I hope to 
suggest how events in Reich's life, his cultural and social 
milieu, and his generation might have informed these 
contradictions and liberating aspects. Following 
Weingartner, I want to suggest that Character Analysis 
contains certain similarities and differences compared with 
a number of other texts. These other texts also examine the 
relationship between sexuality and political domination. 
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They help place Reich's work within a discourse, within the 
context of the historical development of a theory of 
liberation. After Collingwood, I want to believe I am 
creating an image of the past validated by its continuity 
with the present - with an objective rationality which 
endures through time. And like Reich at his best, I see 
this rationality as the hope and strategy for freedom and 
tolerance. 
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CHAPTER III 
BIOGRAPHY AND TEXT 
Perhaps the most disconcerting intersection between 
Character Analysis and its various contexts is where Reich's 
sympathy for his patients in the book seems to emerge from 
his own emotional struggles.I Throughout his life, Reich 
was himself a person in trouble. So Character Analysis 
represents a radical interpenetration of life and text, by 
which the author's personal experience becomes a special 
kind of evidence for his argument. Events in Reich's life 
also have their formal correllative in the text. This is 
the pattern of self-references in Character Analysis which 
indicate both the self-justifying anger of a lonely man and 
his basic life-long impulse toward liberation. 
Consequently, I am going to describe Reich's book first and 
foremost in relationship to the story of his life. 
Wilhelm Reich was born on March 24, 1897, in Galicia, 
and grew up in the Austrian Ukraine. His father Leon was a 
free-thinking Jewish businessman and farmer, raising beef 
cattle under contract to the German army on his large 
estate. He was proud, short-tempered, jealous, and brutal 
to his family and his workers. 
SOcially, the loog arm of [his] father was often felt. 
Reich was not allowed to play with peasant children nor 
with Yiddish-speaking Jewish children. '!be father ai;:pears 
to have been socially very ant>itious, consorting with 
government officials and other high-level persons, but 
Willy's opportunities for playing with peers were scarce. 
The feudal quality of the life is further revealed by a 
story Reich told his second wife, Elsa Lindberg. As a 
child he was not permitted to take part in village dances. 
But one night, while he was watching the dance, a peasant 
boy threw a stone at him. Willy told his father and Leon 
hit the boy's father. So, quite early, Reich was exposed 
to the brute EXMer not only of the father in the home but 
of the property owner in the corrmuni ty, and he experienced 
both in ways that would mark him.2 
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During his childhood, Reich resisted this difficult man1 
and, according to his third wife, Ilsa Ollendorff, 
resentments continued throughout his life. 
Reich talked very little about his relationship with his 
father. I have the feeling that it was a very ant>ivalent 
relationship, because on more than one occasion Reich tried 
to inply that he was not really his father's son, that 
maybe his mother had a relationship with one of the 
Ukrainian peasants - a rather unlikely story for that time 
and place - and in the end, went so far as to offer the 
even more unlikely proposition that he was the offspring of 
his mother and a man fran outer space.3 
But he also held onto positive memories of his father. 
Reich took great satisfaction in the fact that his father 
was not religious, aside from some ritual Jewish 
observances to a~se more orthodox relatives1 that Leon 
was cosmopolitan in orientation and mqdern-minded in his 
farming practices1 that he was a working property owner, 
not a "parasite." In later years Reich stressed that his 
mother, too, was very active on the family estate, a leader 
who helped organize the wanen's work on the farm just as 
the father directed the men.4 
His mother Cecilia was a very beautiful woman, a good 
housewife, unintellectual according to family tradition, and 
deeply loved by her son. 
All through his life Reich idolized his mother. No other 
wanan's cooking over the years, for example, could ever 
reach her perfection. Elsa Lindenberg, Reich's second 
wife, told me that she was never able to make an apple 
strudel just like his mother used to make, and no matter 
hCM hard I tried I could never produce a special cabbage 
dish that he liked exactly the way his mother had made it. 
I once came close when I slightly burned the cabbage, and 
ever since I have had my private doubts about Mrs. Reich's 
perfection as a cook.s 
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However contradictory Reich's deep feelings for his 
parents were, the eccentric charm of these anecdotes of 
burnt cabbage and lovers from outer space imparts a soft 
light on his childhood. It was in many respects idyllic. 
Reich often spoke with a certain nostalgia of his childhood 
years on the farm. He rement>ered especially the young 
Ukrainian girls who were his nursemaids, their earthiness, 
and the warmth with which they cuddled him. He remerrbered 
the folk songs they used to sing, and the folk dances in 
which he sometimes participated. He told of the large 
fishponds where carp were raised, and although he liked to 
eat freshly caught freshwater fish, he never liked fishing, 
and thought of it as a cruel sport. He used to say that it 
always made him think of a great big giant dangling a juicy 
steak in front of a ht.nnan, only to hook the poor htnnan on a 
sharp barb the manent he was tempted to take a bite. He 
remenbered riding for hours over the fields, surveying the 
harvest, and enjoying the smell of the fields, and the 
newmcMl hay.6 
This idyll did not lack a sexual dimension. 
He rement>ered as a boy of four sleeping in the servants• 
room when his parents were away. On several occasions, he 
overheard or witnessed intercourse between a maid and her 
boyfriend. In the course of these experiences, he asked 
the maid if he could "play" the lover. He stressed to one 
informant that she permitted him to do so in a very helpful 
way. Without stimulating him actively, she allowed him to 
move on top of her. Whether this ha~ed once or often is 
uncertain. But Reich clearly attributed great importance 
to his relationship with this peasant girl. He once said 
that by the time he was four there were no secrets for him 
about sex, and he related this clarity in part to his 
sexual play with his nursemaid.7 
An equally significant place in his memories was held by a 
remarkable tutor, as Reich disclosed in a third-person voice 
autobiographical narrative he published in 1948. 
WR' s interest in biology and natural science was created 
early in his life on the farm, close to agriculture, 
cattle-breeding, etc., in which he took part every sunmer 
and during the harvest. Between his eighth and twelfth 
years, he had his own collection and breeding laboratory of 
butterflies, insects, plants, etc. under the guidance of a 
private teacher. The natural life functions, including the 
sexual functioo., were familiar to him as far back as he can 
remerrber. That may very well have determined his later 
strong inclination, as a biopsychiatrist, toward the 
biological foundation of the emotional life of man, and 
also his biophysical discoveries in the fields of medicine 
and biology, as well as education.a 
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These anecdotes also mask a complex of tragedies, a 
core of events, "an existential debt all the rest of a 
lifetime. 11 9 Their fanciful aspects are more than the quaint 
and hazy memories of childhood; they are a meaningful 
breakdown of words and remembrance. Reich's mother 
committed suicide when he was fourteen, after he had 
revealed to his father her real love affair with this tutor. 
Reich published and even more complicatedly voiced narrative 
of the affair as a case study in his first clinical article, 
"The Breakthrough of the Incest Taboo in Puberty", in 1920. 
The tale is told within a purported letter by a patient to 
Reich1 in reality, the patient is an imagined persona for 
Reich, himself. This patterning of imagination and clinical 
evidence, self and vocation, has a meaningful decorum. 
N {name of tutor) began to court her, stimulated by walks 
they took together. He apparently became ever bolder as he 
recognized how things were going - the jealous scenes, etc. 
between ~ parents, and the fact that mother liked him. At 
the beginning I was not canpletely clear about the 
developing relationship. But I began to follow them when I 
noticed mother going into his room when father nai;:.ped after 
lunch. In part I was erotically curious, in part I was 
filled with fearful thoughts that father would wake up. 
And from then on I played .m& and wrsuer, but at the same 
time also defender (italicized by me - the analyst) against 
any surprises from father. I cannot clarify further the 
reasons for rqy behavior. Either it was unconscious hatred 
against rqy father or sexual titillation to be aware of such 
stunning secrets about which rqy father remained ignorant. 
I believe that both factors were equally responsible for rqy 
behavior. 
The relationship between rqy mother and tutor grew 
ever deeper; not a day passed in which they did not seek 
and find the opportunity to be alone •••• 
Shortly after Christmas father went away for three 
weeks and I experienced the most horrible, the most 
upsetting events, which burned themselves deeply into rqy 
feelings and thoughts. 
Mother slept, as always during father's absence, in 
the last bedroom on the corridor. After that came our 
room, then the dining room, and then his (N's) room. Right 
on the first night (I was so tense I had not closed rqy 
eyes) I heard rqy mother get up and - the horror grabs me by 
the throat 1 - heard her slippered walk and saw her, clad 
only in a night gown, pass through our room. SOOn I heard 
the door of his room open and not canpletely shut. And 
then quiet. 
I sprang up from rqy bed and followed, shivering, rqy 
teeth chattering from anxiety, horror, and cold; I moved 
right up to the door, which was only partly closed, and 
listened. Oh horrible memory, which tears rqy rement>rance 
of rqy mother to dust, her memory always besmirched anew 
with dirt and muck 1 Must I then say everything? The pen 
bristles, no, rqy ego, rqy whole being is against it, and yet 
I will and must write on. 
I heard kisses, whispers, the frightening noise of 
the bed, and on it lay rqy mother. And a few yards away 
stood your son and heard your shame •. suddenly quiet. I 
had evidently made a noise in rqy excitement, for I heard 
calming words from him and then, then again, oh! (The last 
sentence, especially the last words, written a~rently in 
the highest excitement, with heavy strokes of the pen.) 
Only quiet, quiet toward this nerve-shattering 
tragedy, in order to accomplish the superhuman! To judge 
objectively! What a mockery! What a resolution! 
From that catastrophic night I rement>er only that rqy 
wish at first was to plunge into the room but I was held 
back by the thought: they will kill youl 
I had read somewhere that lovers get rid of any 
intruder, so with wild fantasies in rqy brain I slii;ped back 
to rqy bed, rqy joy of life shattered, torn apart in rqy 
inmost being for rqy whole life! 
SO it went, night after night; always I slii;ped back 
and waited till morning. Gradually I became used to it! 
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The horror disappeared and erotic feelings wen the ua>er 
hand. And then .tm thought came to ~ to plunge into the 
.IQQID, ,grui .tQ ~ intercourse with ~ mother with the 
threat tbst .if. n didn '.t .I would tell ~ father. 
For my part, I went regularly to the chani:>eana.id.10 
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It was not uncommon for Freud and his followers to 
fictionalize their case histories to some extent and to 
project their personal memories into them. And the origins 
of this letter must remain obscure. It might be largely 
authentic, perhaps a document from Reich's own, abortive 
analysis under Isidor Sadger. Or it might be primarily a 
literary object, perhaps an imitation of the romantic 
epistolary novel. In either case, it contains a series of 
significant edges, disjunctures, displacements to language. 
The general movement of the piece is indicated in the 
second sentence, one of increasing boldness and self-
recognition toward fulfillment in the boy's fantasies and 
his mother's betrayal of the core oedipal situation. 
Ambiguity is introduced by a self-referring break in the 
narrative's movement, the parenthetical aside "(italicized 
by me - the analyst)", that is both a confusion of persona 
and a suspension of affect by transferring the reader's 
attention to a formal matter. As the sexual drama 
intensifies, a number of rhetorical flourishes intervene, 
which in their literariness do not so much express feeling 
as fend off the imminent erotic climax. 
o horrible memory, which tears my remercbrance of my mother 
to dust, her memory always besmirched anew with dirt and 
muck! Must I then say everything? The pen bristles, no my 
ego, my whole being is against it, and yet I will and must 
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write on. 
The excesses, here, the repetitions of the word memory and 
of the allusions to filth, as well as the formal emphasis on 
hesitation in the stop and go diction, are parried by 
another matter of fact intervention by the analyst persona. 
('.lbe last sentence, especially the last words, written 
ag;>arently in the highest excitement, with heavy strokes of 
the pen.) 
The most significant formal residue is the affectless tone 
of the final statement, nFor my part, I went regularly to 
the chambermaid.• Reich's patient persona abruptly assumes 
the matter-of-fact attitude of the analyst. Not only does 
this sentence seem to be an after-thought, an anti-climax 
that is being tossed aside 1 it also signifies a complex 
historical attitude. By one reading, it might suggest 
domination, the objectification of the servant as a mere 
recourse, an instead-of, a useful receptacle for Reich's 
blocked passion for his mother, but of no consequence in and 
of herself. Formally, the sentence resembles the reified 
discourse of instrumental science. But this radical change 
of tone creates a more complex -edge. The simplicity of the 
statement, reflecting the diction of the analyst, also 
suggests a turn to reason, even cleanliness, a purification, 
after the emotional and rhetorical excesses of the oedipal 
fantasy. 
Of course, it also represents a diversion from a very 
real, unrelenting tragedy. Cecilia's suicide was a drawn 
45 
out and horrible one. Unable to envision divorce or flight, 
she endured her husband's recriminations and increased 
brutality for two years, until in 1909 she drank a household 
solvent, died after several days of great pain, left Reich's 
father devastated. Father and son became very close, 
perhaps by virtue of their shared remorse, but only for a 
brief time. 
Only the thought of his two sons kept him fran taking his 
own life. He insured his life heavily and afterward 
caitracted µieurnaiia, standing for hours in cold weather in 
a pond, ostensibly fishing. The_pnelll'OOilia developed into 
tuberculosis and he died in 1914.ll 
The insurance for his sons was never recovered, as the 
company suspected suicide. In the end, Reich's younger 
brother Robert assumed financial responsibility for the two 
impoverished young men during Wilhelm's student years; and 
the strain very likely, or at least so Reich felt, 
precipitated his death by tuberculosis in 1926. 
A two-sided meaning emerges from this incredible 
family tragedy and the contradictions in Reich's memories of 
it, and finds its way into Character Analysis. First, 
sexual activity, the tender female embrace, remains with 
Reich both the final recourse of life and an absolute 
justification for forgiveness. And second, words are a much 
more problematic form of human expression. They are 
elusive; they have the power to mask the truth, unleash 
suffering, and bind remorse. These two assumptions form the 
foundation of Reich's psychoanalytic theory. His career was 
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to move psychoanalytic technique beyond words into physical 
processes. They reflect a combination of powerful 
experiences - of sensuous peasant girls, a beloved mother, a 
hard father, a young boy's confused attempt at truthful 
utterances and good faith, and their tragic consequences. 
These events gave to Reich's psychoanalytic career a 
powerful impetus. After his discharge from the Austrian 
army in 1918, Reich entered the University of Vienna as a 
law student1 but he switched to medicine before the end of 
his first semester. With Otto Fenichel, Reich organized an 
extracurricular seminar on sexuality. This led to studying 
psychoanalytic writings and an introduction to Freud in 
1919. By early 1920, Reich was seeing patients Freud had 
referred to him, and in the summer he became a guest member 
of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, at the remarkable age 
of twenty-three. 
Finishing medical school in 1922, he became the first 
clinical assistant at the Psychoanalytic Polyclinic in 
Vienna, which Freud had established to provide therapy to 
working class people, laborers, farmers, clerks, and 
students. Reich observed in these patients a different form 
of emotional disorder than Freud had treated in his middle 
class clients. Instead of typical symptom neuroses, such as 
obsessive-compulsive habits or hysterical paralysis, Reich 
found generally disorganized lives and anti-social and self-
destructi ve tendencies. Also in 1922, Reich suggested and 
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Freud supported the establishment of the Technical Seminar 
for Psychoanalytic Therapy. Failures young analysts 
encountered in their practices were discussed under the 
leadership of an experienced therapist. Reich assumed this 
position in 1924 and held it into 1930. Reich's 
theoretical innovations, his development of psychoanalysis 
beyond symptom analysis to the systematic treatment of the 
entire character as a biological entity, came out of his 
experiences in the Polyclinic and the Technical Seminar. 
Reich dealt with the failures young analysts were 
coming across in their individual practices under the 
problem of resistance. In Freud's work, the concept of 
resistance explains the impediments to free verbal 
associations basically as the fear of touching upon 
repressed memories. Overcoming resistance is a crucial 
point in classical psychoanalytic theory. 
If we comnunicate to a patient some idea which he has at 
cne time repressed but which we have discovered in him, 
our telling him makes at first no change in his mental 
coodition. Above all, it does not reroove the repression 
nor undo its effects, as might perhap:; be expected from the 
fact that the previously unconscious idea has now becane 
cooscious. Ql the contrary, all that we shall achieve at 
first will be a fresh rejection of the repressed idea •••• 
Actually there is no lifting of the repressioo until the 
conscious idea, after the resistances have been overcane, 
has entered into connection with the unconscious memory-
trace. It is only through the makin~ conscious of the 
latter itself that success is achieved. 
That is, the patient must not only know and understand his 
burdensome memories, he must re-experience them as 
recollection and the consequent release of cathectic energy. 
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Reich extended the concept to include the production of too 
much material with no emotion. Patients tended to offer 
deceptions and trivialities in order to please the analyst 
out of politeness, while defending themselves against the 
pain and deep feelings that are consequences of cure. Even 
authentic verbal material was often merely translated into 
new symptoms and deeper levels of the disturbance. In 
classical theory, resistance is overcome by transference, 
the emergence of the analyst as a new object-cathexis, to 
reactivate erotic strivings, overcome repression, and make 
conscious their association with the past. Reich 
essentially broke with Freud in arguing that the affect 
produced by remembering repressed material was insufficient 
to bring about cure. Transference and remembrance in the 
analytic situation, he argued, was secondary to establishing 
a permanent object-cathexis a fulfilled romantic 
relationship in the patient's daily life. 
For Reich observed that his patients' patterns of 
sexual activity, both past and present, were more 
consistently related to the success or failure of their 
analysis than any pattern of words. 
We learn from analytic practice that sane cases, 
notwithstanding protracted and copious analysis, remain 
refractory; whereas other cases, despite incanplete 
examination of the unconscious, can achieve lasting 
practical recovery. In coopiring these two groups, it 
turned out that, after the analysis, the former cases, 
namely those which remained refractory or readily relapsed, 
had not succeeded in establishing a regulated sexual life. 
In an investigation of the prognosis of average cases, it 
was further shown that, under otherwise equal caiditions, 
the chances of cure were that much more favorable the more 
canpletely genit:rj- primacy had been achieved in childhood 
and adolescence.I 
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Reich developed a therapeutic procedure that attacked 
directly his patients' physical bearing, strained 
mannerisms, and polite lies into which their natural sexual 
expressiveness had been channelled and suppressed. He 
sensed that the neurotic's apparent niceness concealed 
attitudes of doubt and distrust toward her or himself, the 
analyst, and life in general. He raised this contradiction 
by forcing their anger and ultimately encouraging the 
integration of their passion into genitality. He abandoned, 
here, Freud's principle of strict neutrality toward his 
patients. Instead, he criticized and mocked them - going so 
far as to manipulate them physically, to attack the knotting 
and atrophying of their musculature, their physiological 
defenses against erotic sensations. He treated their 
character armor, a concept by which he described a 
functional, integrated distortion - a physical crippling, an 
attitude, and an entire mode of existence. 
In the analysis, the neurotic character traits as a whole 
prove to be a canpact defense mecbanism against our 
therapeutic efforts, and when we trace the origin of this 
character •armor• analytically, we see that it also has a 
definite econanic function. such armor serves on the one 
hand as a defense against external stimuli; on the other 
hand it proves to be a means of gaining mastery over the 
libido, which is continuously pushing forward fran the id, 
because libidinal and sadistic energy is used up in the 
neurotic reaction formations, canpensations, etc. Anxiety 
is continually being bOlllld in the processes which are at 
the bottan of the formation and preservatiai of this armor 
in the same way that, according to Freud's description, 
anxiety is bound in the canµllsive symptoms.14 
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The character armor represents a systematic typology, 
relating specific emotional disorders, character types, and 
regions of the body where blocked erotic energy accumulates. 
The treatment of the armoring allowed not only psychic 
liberation, but also the freeing of the body for sexual 
potency. Reich discovered that after the resistances had 
been addressed, after the character and its physical 
armoring had been attacked and dissolved, the important 
childhood memories, the Oedipus complex and castration fear, 
came forth more easily and were faced honestly by his 
patients. In addition, they experienced symptoms as 
emanating from outside, like germs or social pressures, 
rather than as part of their selves. They became able to 
deal with the blows of the world with courage and to 
distinguish the erotic strivings inside their bodies with 
hope for fulfillment. 
The basis of this physiology of emotions is the 
radical valuing of silence. 
Orgaie therapy, as opposed to all other f orrns of therapy, 
attempts to influence the organism not through the use of 
hlllllan language but by getting the patient to express 
himself biologica1ly. This approach leads him into a depth 
which he coo.tinually flees. In this way the orgone 
therapist learns, understands, and influences the language 
of the living organism. It is hardly possible to obtain 
the primacy language of expressioo of the living protoplasm 
in the patient in a "µire" form. If the patient's mode of 
expression were biologically "pure•, he would have no 
reason to seek the help of an orgone therapist. we have to 
go through a welter of pathological, unnatural expressive 
movements (i.e., movements not native to the process of the 
living organism) to arrive at the genuine biological rnode 
of expression. Human biopathy, indeed, is nothing other 
than the sum total of all the distortions of the natural 
modes of expression of the living organism. By urunasking 
the pathological modes of expression, we get to knCM hmnan 
biopathy at a depth inaccessible to methods of cure 
operating with hmnan language. This is not to be ascribed 
to a deficiency on the part of these methods; they are 
adequate in their own spere. With it§ distorted expression 
.Qf ~' howeyer, biopatqy lies outside the sphere of 
language and ideas.15 
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Reich is asserting in Character Analysis that every human 
attitude, gesture, and utterance are the functional 
expression of a physiological process. This process is the 
flow of sexual energy. It occurs beyond words and conscious 
intentions. Indeed, it is generally twisted within its 
mediations the experiences of social life, learned 
perversions, deceptions, and restraints. It is transformed 
within layers of words and memories into anxiety, neurosis, 
and disease. It is authentic only as the silent, autonomous 
release of orgasm which is the convulsive expression of the 
core of the human body, silent and imageless. Reich views 
this as a significant departure from psychoanalysis. 
The orgasm is not a psychic phenanenon. <il the contrary, 
it is a phenanenon brought about solely by the reauction of 
all psychic activity to the primal vegetative function, 
i.e., precisely by the suspensiai of psychic fantasizing 
and imaginative activity. It is nonetheless the central 
problem of i;sychic ecal011¥. Its inclusiai in psychology 
not only permits a concrete treatment of the quantitative 
factor in psychic life and the establishnent of the 
cormection between the psychic and the physiological factor 
(i.e., vegetative factor). over and above this, it leads 
of necessity to a significant change in the psychoanalytic 
view of the neurotic process. Formerly, the Oedipus 
canpl.ex was regarded as an explanatiai of neurotic illness. 
Today we realize that whether or not the Oedipus canplex 
leads to neurosis depends upai other factors: the child-
parent caiflict does not becane pathogenic unless there is 
also a disturbance in the child's sexual econany; this 
early disturbance lays the groundwork for the subsequent 
ma.lfunctiming of the libido econany in adulthood; it 
derives its energy precisely fran what helped to bring it 
about, i.e., the stasis of genital-sexual energy. In this 
way the accent was shifted from the contJRt of the 
experience to the economy of vegetative energy. 
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Certainly, Reich, who intends to convey in writing 
both a radical departure from accepted theory and a reality 
which resides in silence, faces serious formal difficulties, 
both of persuasion and conceptualization. I want to 
juxtapose, here, a passage from each of the two major case 
studies in Character Analysis. These represent solutions to 
the writer's problem; they illustrate what tends to happen 
in reading this text - the experience of a variety of 
shocks and disjunctures, empty spaces, which allow 
themselves to be filled with the reader's feelings and self-
consciousness. First, is of a masochistic character type. 
The patient, whose analysis we will follow in its essential 
features, without going into the full details of his 
illness, began the treatment with the following canplaints: 
he had been wholly incapable of work and socially apathetic 
since he was sixteen. In the sexual sphere, there was a 
severe masochistic perversion. He had never cared for 
intercourse with girls but had masturbated nightly for 
hours in the way characteristic of the pregenital libido 
structure. He would roll around on his stanach, and 
squeeze his penis while fantasizing that a man or woman was 
beating him with a whip. In short, he did not masturbate 
in the normal way, i.e., exciting the penis by regular 
friction, but by kneading it, clamping it between his 
thighs, rul:t>ing it between the palms of his hands, etc. 
mm m sensed tbgt m W9§. about to ejaculate, he wou1d 
bQld ~ gng ~ until the excitation had subsided, in 
order, .then, .tQ begin ~. He masturbated in this way 
night after night, often during the daytime also, until 
finally, completely exhausted, he would yield to an 
ejaculation in which the semen did not sp.irt out 
rhythnically but merely flowed out. Afterwards, he felt 
battered, extremely tired, incapable of doing anything, 
fretful, "masochistic", tormented. He had an especially 
hard time dragging himself out of bed in the morning. In 
spite of an overwhelming sense of guilt, he was not able to 
µit a stop to this "loafing in bed." He later described 
the whole thing as "masochistic bog.• The more he rebelled 
against it, the less he succeeded in extricating himself 
from this •masochistic rnooa•, the more deeply he was 
engulfed by it. When he entered analysis, this kind of 
sexual experience had been going on for years. The effects 
on his personality and on his emotional life had been 
devastating.17 
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What is noteworthy in this passage is the candor and 
concreteness with which the perversion is described. The 
straightforward erotic material is broken up only once, by 
the brief shift to classical clinical language, a reference 
to "the pregenital libido structure.• The writing is 
managed, instead, by the formal creation of suspensions. 
The first of these is the italicized print of the 
statement: 
When he sensed that he was about to ejacu1ate, be. would 
hold back and wait until the excitation beQ Subsided, .in 
order, jj:m, .tQ beQin ~. 
This is a break in the material face of the text; it is also 
a formal reference to the content of the statement, to the 
breaking up of the flow of conscious erotic material. As 
such, it throws the reader into self-consciousness; it 
creates a gap in the flow of words for contemplation or the 
intrusion of personal associations. A second formal 
curiosity also serves this function. This is the series of 
enquoted words: "masochistic•, "loafing in bed•, 
•masochistic bog", and •masochistic mood." Not until the 
third and fourth item is the referent of the quotations 
indicated. This creates a similar space of questioning, 
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confusion, opening for self-consciousness in the course of 
reading. In addition, the erotic content of the narrative 
tends to overpower the one attempt Reich makes to establish 
a conventional control over his material. This is the 
remark, "he did not masturbate in the normal way.• In the 
context of sexology in the 1930"s, it is itself provocative 
and liberating - that masturbation should at all be judged 
normal. These offer considerable space or freedom for the 
reader to work at her or his own relationship to the very 
frank material Reich presents - in a sense, to self-create 
the text and open up the psychoanalytic discourse as 
potentiality. 
A somewhat different formal strategy appears in 
Reich's narrative of the case history of a schizophrenic, 
but it signifies a similar moment of cooperation between 
author and reader. 
What is to follow now will awear utterly incredible. 
Therefore, I wish to assure the reader that I had not the 
faintest idea of the existence of such mechanisms. But 
since the treabnent of this case the facts to be described 
have been found in several other cases of schizophrenia. 
Clinically, as well as orgone-biophysically, there can no 
lcnger be any doubt about the reality of these facts. 
Nineteenth session 
The patient came to the nineteenth sessicn very calm 
arXl co-ordinated, but slightly absent-minded. She spoke 
very slowly, as if against some great obstacle1 she said 
that she was very depressed. She had been shopping the day 
before, for the first time in many mmths1 she had bought 
many things, had enjoyed them as never before, had shown 
them to her friends, and had slept well. The following 
morning, however, she was overcome by great emptiness and 
tiredness. '!here was a "nothingness• in her1 and she had 
felt the need to sit quietly in sane comer "and not to 
move at all.• •Every movement was such a great effort.• 
She wanted to be by herself. She gave the impression of an 
oncaning catatonia with imnobility and perseveratiai. 
"Everything was very far away •••• I watched If!Yself as 
if I were outside of If!YSelf; I felt clearly double; a body 
here and a soul there ••• (Saying this, she pointed outward 
toward the wall)... .I ~ ~ _tmt .I ~ ~ person ... 
but .I am outside mvself ••• perhaps there wbere ~ 'forces' 
~ ... · 
She searched with her eyes anxiously aloog the walls. 
Then, suddenly, she asked: ~ is the aurora borealis? 
(Very slowly, as if with great effort) I heard about it 
once; there are patterns and wavy pathways in the sky ••• 
(She looked again searchingly along the walls of the room, 
as if strongly absent) • • • I hear you, I see you, but 
sanehow far away ••• at a very great distance ••• I know very 
well that I am trembling now, I feel it ••• but it is not 
me, it is SOOtething else ••• (after a loog pause) ••• I would 
like to get rid of this body; it is not me; .I ~ .tQ ~ 
where ~ 'forces' ~· •• " 
I was deeply moved in a quite unprofessiooal manner 
when I witnessed her experience of the schizophrenic split 
and depersonalizatioo in such an unequivocal manner •••• 
This was clearly one of the most iqx>rtant sessions 
in her treatment and, I must a&l, one of the most 
instructive happenings in I1¥ whole medical experience. Let 
us pause for a while and try to understand what had 
happened. To the disinterested institutional psychiatrist, 
who sees such things happen many times every day, it means 
"just nothing"~ only another of those "crazy things going 
on in the lunatic.• To us, this experience of a living 
organism is full of meaning and deep secrets. I shall try 
to connect these phenanena with what we know fran 
orgone-biophysical functioning of the organism. As far as 
I know, neither psychology nor chemistry nor classical 
physics could offer any plausible interpretation.18 
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Again, the clinical evidence is presented concretely. And 
again, the material face of the text, the typography, the 
pauses, elisions in the patient's musings, the 
italicazations of certain passages, manage the material with 
the effect of creating spaces, suspensions for the reader's 
own thoughts. Notably, the numerous emphases on certain 
words and phrases indicate they are of theoretical or 
interpretative significance. But they are emphasized 
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inconsistently, so their significance is merely suggested. 
Reich withholds any specific explanation of them, 
encouraging the reader to work out their meaning himself or 
herself, and leaving the reader hanging. They become an 
internal voicing of the text, signifying individuality, 
eccentricity, personality. Also notable are Reich's 
dramatic references to himself as scientist. The most 
sensible reading of his intention, here, is to bring the 
reader into the text, into collusion with his argument. But 
the tone of these statements at the same time works against 
such an intention. They are excesses. The evidence is 
"utterly incredible", "there can no longer be any doubt 
about the reality of these facts•, they are "full of meaning 
and deep secrets." The alliance of author and reader in 
this knowledge is too special. It is exclusive of the 
professional community of science: "neither psychology nor 
chemistry nor classical physics could offer any plausible 
interpretations." So the reader is left on the edge of his 
own involvement and suspicion, a line which leads toward 
criticism, self-reliance, and self-consciousness. Finally, 
the dramatic meaning of this case history is the surprising 
discovery that schizophrenics are in touch with an otherwise 
suppressed physiological reality. The streamings of sexual 
energy, of which they are intensely aware, but which they 
misname, are more important than ordinary thinking and 
feeling, truer than normal discourse. This meaning is in 
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accord with the consequences, whether intentional or not, of 
Reich's formal approach - with breaks in the language of the 
text and the attention of the reader. These both signify 
and allow moments for deep processes to intervene on the 
surface of problematic words. 
Reich's work in the psychoanalytic movement paralleled 
a second, equally important, career in working class 
politics during these years of preparation and writing of 
Character Malysis. This was a natural consequence of his 
curiosity and sympathy for the lower class patients he 
treated in the Polyclinic. It was precipitated directly by 
a notorious incident - the murder of eighty-nine leftist 
demonstrators and the injury of over a thousand more by 
Vienna police on July 15, 1927. Reich witnessed the mass 
demonstration and the ensuing three hour battle, and joined 
the Austrian Communist Party the same evening. 
According to Reich, his political experience decidedly 
influenced his theoretical and therapeutic work 
psychoanalysis. 
In 1928, I founded the Socialist Society for sex-counseling 
and sex-Research with several Viennese physicians. Based 
on sex-econanic principles, it established the first sex-
counseling centers for workers and business employees in 
Vienna •••• '!he society took the positicn that sexual misery 
was essentially brought about by social conditions rooted 
in the bourgeois social order and that it could not be 
renoved entirely but at least could be alleviated by aid to 
the individual. In a<i:liticn, information on sexual matters 
was to be widely circulated arncng working people. The 
knowledge underlying this inforrnaticn would be broadened by 
social work and research on individuals. I reserved the 
positicn of scientific director for nrtself. Six counseling 
centers were opened inmediately, each directed by a 
in 
physician. 'Ihree obstetricians placed themselves at our 
disposal to assist with problem pregnancies. A lawyer also 
participated. 
(What was new about our counseling centers [sex-
hygiene clinics] was that we integrated the problems of the 
neuroses, sexual disturbances, and everyday cooflicts. It 
was also new to attack the neuroses by prevention rather 
than treatnent. This depended basically on the handling of 
sexuality in children and young people •••• )19 
58 
This clinical work also had political intentions and impact. 
Reich experienced successes in organizing especially 
proletarian youth on the issues of sexual freedom comparable 
to his achievements in therapeutic technique1 he inspired 
dramatic new interest and commitment among thousands of 
working people, as well as party intellectuals and 
organizers. 
His approach, however, was ultimately unpolitical. 
The Communist Party leadership in both Austria and Germany 
calculated that the issue of sexual freed om would deflect 
revolutionary energies. And influential figures in the 
psychoanalytic movement feared the potentially destructive 
consequences - not only to their growing and lucrative 
private practices, but also from the increasingly 
reactionary political climate - of such a challenge to 
conventional morality. Consequently, Reich was expelled 
from the Communist Party in November, 1933, and from the 
International Psychiatric Association during its congress in 
Lucerne in the summer of 1934. Matters of principle and 
significant theoretical issues were also considered by 
Reich's opponents during these controversies. But there was 
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sufficient opportunism, double dealing, and hysterical 
resentment against Reich on the parts of the leaderships of 
these organizations that Reich justifiably felt himself 
persecuted.2e 
His struggle with these institutions during the early 
1930's informed another central concept of Character 
Analysis, that of the emotional plague. This term describes 
the tendency of men and women to think and behave 
domineeringly and destructively, even in the name of reason 
and morality. It represents Reich's effort to understand 
his own persecution. He attempted to name that failure 
whereby the most humanistic, scientifically-minded 
traditions succumbed to inflexibility, pettiness, and fear 
in their struggle against fascism. 
An essential and basic characteristic of ~ emotional 
plaque reaction .i§. .tnet. action and the motive of the 
action never coincide. k ~ motive is concealed and a 
fillBm motive .ll given ~ _tm reason for the action. In the 
reaction of the natural and healthy individual, motive, 
action, and gQSl form an organic unity. Nothing is 
concealed. This unity is imnediately evident. For 
example: the healthy individual has no other motive for 
his sexual acts than his natural need for love, and no 
other goal than its gratification. The ascetic, plague-
riden individual, on the other hand, uses ethical codes to 
justify his sexual debility... The person afflicted with 
the emotional plague is distinguished from the healthy 
individual by the fact that he makes bi§. demands of life 
not all.y on himself but, aboye fil, m his enviraunent •••• 
Individuals afflicted with the emotional plague do not 
tolerate views which threaten their armor or unmask their 
irrational motives. The healthy person is happy to be 
given an insight into his motives. The plague-afflicted 
individual is seized by frenzy. When views contrary to his 
own disrupt his life and work, the healthy individual puts 
up a strong rational fight for the preservation of hi§. way 
of life. The plague-afflicted person fights against other 
modes of life even when they don't concern him in any way 
whatever. He is impelled to fight because he sensea the 
very existence of other ways of life as a provocation.~l 
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Of interest, here, is the special validity Reich's own 
work relationships have for this concept. Reich engages in 
a particular mode of generalization, from personal 
experience to historical significance to scientific concept. 
This is a peculiar mix of intimacy and grandeur, everyday 
life and instrumental technique. 
No one will take it as an insult if he is told that he is 
suffering from a cardiac disease or that he is nervous. No 
one should take it as an insult if he is told that he is 
suffering from an "acute attack of the emotional plague." 
we sometimes hear it said among orgonomists: "No sense 
wasting your time with me today, I'm pesty." In our 
circle, when someone is afflicted with a minor case of the 
emotional plague, he deals with it by isolating himself and 
waiting until the attack of irrationalism passes. In 
acute cases, where rational thinking and friendly advice 
are of no avail, orgone therapy is used to remove the 
inf ecticn. It can be seen again and again that such acute 
attacks of the emotional plague are always produced by a 
disturbance in the person's love life. They disai;:pear on 
the elimination of the disturbance. The acute attack of 
the plague is such a familiar phenomenon to me and to II\Y 
circle of co-workers that we accept it as a matter of 
course and deal with it objectively. It is extremely 
important for stu:lents of orgone therapy to learn to 
perceive acute attacks of the plague in themselves before 
such attacks go too far, to know how to keep such attacks 
from getting the best of them, to prevent them from 
spreading into the social environment and causing damage 
there, and, by means of intellectual detachment, to wait 
until they pass. In this way, we succeed in keeping 
harmful effects in our cooperative work at a minimum. 
Sanetimes such an attack cannot be dealt with and the 
afflicted person causes a certain amount of harm or even 
resigns. we take such misfortunes in the same way one 
would take the acute physical ailment or demise of a 
beloved colleague.22 
Not only Reich's viewpoint, but also his tone and sense seem 
wrong, or at least surprising. The very term for 
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irrationality, the emotional plague, is peculiar not only 
for the way in which it suggests emotions to be concrete 
entities, infections, mechanistic phenomena, but also for 
its ominous power. The language is at once catastrophic, 
clinical, and intimate. The sense of the text moves between 
suggestions of terror and home remedy. The moments Reich is 
describing with such foreboding are personal and 
professional jealousies, anger, selfishness, competitive 
resentments, the stuff that careers, office politics, daily 
life, and regrets are made of. Again, these represent a 
disjuncture in the text. They strike the reader as 
improprieties, puzzlements within a scientific discourse -
as the interpenetration of text and life, science and 
intimate charm, reason and special pleading. 
Reich's description is also utopian, unrealistic, a 
misleading account of his relationships with his workers, 
which were actually much cloudier. From 1935 until his 
death, Reich attempted to compensate for his homeless, 
outcast predicament as a scientist by constructing 
organizations of his own. The last of these, the Orgone 
Institute, which Reich founded after emigrating to New York 
in 1941 and ultimately settling at Rangeley, Maine, became 
consumed repeatedly with its director's sexual 
unfaithfulness and jealousy. He had affairs with patients, 
co-workers, and co-workers' wives1 and he projected bad 
feelings with destructive consequences. 
Always, in times of stress, one of Reich's very hmnan 
failings came to the foreground, and that was his violent 
jealousy. He would always emphatically deny that he was 
jealous, but there is no getting away from the fact that he 
would accuse his wife of infidelity with any man who came 
to his mim as a possible rival, whether colleague, friend, 
local shopkeeper, or casual acquaintance. It was one of 
those strange contradictions in Reich's make-up, and 
another one that must have been founded on some basic, 
unresolved feelings of insecurity, because there were no 
reasons in fact for these jealousies. However, they seemed 
to provide him with what he must have felt was a rational 
outlet for his anger against the world.23 
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He also dominated his staff at the Institute, unable to work 
with anyone except the most obedient and unquestioning. 
I think, theoretically, he expected people to know what 
they were doing, to follow him in his pursuits because they 
knew he was right or that his theories were correct or 
because they felt about these things the same way he did. 
But in practice he overlooked the fact that few of those 
around him were equipped, emotionally or otherwise, to 
follow him or to understand his theories. They would 
follow, if they did, out of admiration, out of love, out of 
blind loyalty or sometimes, out of fear of being kicked out 
of his orbit. The power of his personality was enormous, 
and was difficult to understand. It was this inflexible 
attitooe of his, more than anything else, that again and 
again, lost him friends and co-workers.24 
The direction of Reich's career after his expulsions 
from the communist and psychoanalytic movements was toward 
a mechanical explanation of this sort of irrational feeling. 
His theoretical work became increasingly projective, an 
identification of historical with personal conflicts, and 
their universalization into a wonderfully imaginative and 
suggestive, but eccentric, physics and cosmology. In an 
analogy to the autonomic undulations of the body musculature 
during orgasm, Reich postulated a quantifiable flow of 
electrical energy throughout the human body and all living 
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organisms. This also is a wave-like motion, an alternation 
between the interior and exterior 1 imi ts of the body. In 
1934, he attempted to document this by measuring changes in 
the skin potential of his patients' erogenous areas. He 
found correspondences among a tendency of the deep 
functioning of the body toward the periphery, increased skin 
charge, and erotic and pleasurable feelings on one hand, and 
movement away from the periphery, decreased skin charge, and 
subjective feelings of unpleasure or anxiety on the other. 
In 1935, Wilhelm Hoffmann, a German physiologist 
collaborating with Reich, attempted to test these findings 
and Reich's general theory by measuring the skin potential 
of schizophrenic patients. Their emotional withdrawal 
should have been manifested in lower skin potential 
measurements, especially in the conventional sex-sensitive 
areas of their bodies. But Hoffmann was unable to reproduce 
any difference at all, and Reich angrily repudiated his 
colleague's experiments. 
In new observations with plant· tissue in solution, 
Reich argued that the erotic-like pulsations of 
disintegrating cells were evidence of a fundamental life 
form, which he named the bion. Critics attempting to 
replicate his studies dismissed his claims, insisting he had 
witnessed Brownian movement, the tendency of small particles 
to oscillate as a result of their collision with neighboring 
molecules. Reich's resentment and isolation grew. 
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In 1941, he met with Albert Einstein and attempted to 
explain the bion, as well as further discoveries: the 
release of a bluish light and light corpuscles concomitant 
to the creation of bions by means of heating and 
disintegrating beach sand in solution; also, the seeming 
accumulation of heat within specially constructed boxes of 
celotex, steel and glass wool, and sheet iron. Reich 
described these phenomena as the release and absorption of a 
basic life energy associated with the bion, which he named 
orgone energy. He reported still more experiments, in which 
cancer-afflicted rats placed inside the orgone accumulator 
boxes experienced significantly increased life spans. 
Einstein was initially excited by Reich's visit. 
He also promised to support Reich's discovery if the 
findings were verified. Before leaving, Reich suggested 
that Einstein could now understand the rumor that he was 
insane. Einstein replied that he certainly could •••• 
Subsequently, he wrote Reich that he had limited his 
efforts to the terrperature difference because of his 
inability to exclude subjective impressions regarding the 
light manifestations of orgone energy. Initially, he found 
the accumulator temperature regularly higher.... However, 
an assistant had offered the explanation that this 
difference was due to convection currents between the air 
over the table and the air of the room as a whole •••• 
To Einstein's credit, he thought seriously for awhile 
and he experimented. But once satisfied with his own 
explanation, he believed the matter "completely solved", 
and showed no wish to pursue Reich's further 
experiments.25 
In desperation, Reich pressed Einstein to give public 
support for his work. The physicist "responded angrily 
about having his name used for advertising purposes. 11 26 
Reich reacted with the accusation "that Einstein's sudden 
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indifference was part of a general communist-inspired 
conspiracy against Reich's work.27 
Also during 1941, Reich began experimenting with sick 
human beings in the accumulator boxes. Patients reported 
experiencing feelings of increased well-being, as well as 
decreased pain. A number of Reich's cancer patients claimed 
remission and significant shrinking of tumors to allow 
successful surgery. 
During the later 1940's and into the 1950's, he 
further elaborated the theory of orgone energy as an 
antidote to an imminent planetary disaster, manifested in 
such phenomena as nuclear radiation, the emotional plague, 
weather disturbances, and flying saucer sightings. His son 
Peter reveals a sense of Reich's work and thinking in these 
years, which maintains, still, a disturbing tension among 
child's play, paranoid fantasy, and scientific intuition. 
I felt around in the sand near the base of the tree until I 
found the buried metal plate. I dug the sand away from the 
plate and lifted it up. Beneath it was a small hole in the 
ground. I reached into the hole carefully, because there 
might be scorpions, and took out a small bundle wrapped in 
black banana skins. I laid the bundle on the metal plate 
and slcwly unwrapped the bright green glow-in-the-dark 
yoyo. It was a beautiful bright yoyo and I was sorry I 
couldn't play with it. I slipped the loop over ~ finger 
to do a few whirls with it but then I remercbered that Daddy 
said it was bad for me. I put it back onto the metal plate 
and went into the kitchen for water. I poured the water 
into the hole to loosen up the dirt and then I started 
digging. 
oacHy said I had to bury the glow-in-the-dark yoyo 
because the glow stuff was deadly just like fluorescent 
light. Glow-in-the-dark light was bad energy and it didn't 
mix with Orgone Energy, which was good energy. Daddy was 
trying to kill the bad energy in the atmosphere. Bad 
energy came from flying saucers and boni:>s. The cloudbuster 
cleaned the atmosphere of the deadly orgone - we called it 
DOR - and fought the flying saucers. Only we called the 
flying saucers EAs. It was initials. The ~ stood for 
something and the A stood for something. Daddy told me 
what it was but I forgot. We had names for a lot of stuff. 
The EA's energy was like glow-in-the-dark enery and it made 
us sick. 
We were all sensitive to strange energy things, 
especially Ir!Y sister Eva. Fluorescent light was really 
bad, and Eva could never understand hCM people could 
survive in office buildings with dead light energy. The 
same with glCM-in-the-dark watches or television. It got 
so Eva could tell if someone was wearing a glCM-in-the-dark 
watch just by feeling the energy around him. She could 
feel tv that way too and it made her sick. She was the one 
who spotted fC!Y green glCM-in-the-dark yoyo. One day when I 
came near her she felt funny and got a little green 
herself. She asked me what I was wearing and where I had 
been. Then I took out the glow-in-the-dark yoyo and 
started yoyoing and she almost fainted. That was when 
Daddy said I had to bury it.28 
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In order to support his cloudbuster a machine 
designed both to control the weather and defend against 
invasions from outer space and other orgone energy 
experiments, Reich began marketing the accumulator boxes; 
this had disastrous consequences. In 1946 and 1947, he came 
under attack in two very damaging articles in The New 
Republic: one, a review of Reich's The ~ Psychology of 
Fascism, "accused Reich of 'utter contempt for the masses 
because he stressed their mysticism and incapacity for 
freedom'"; the second, •The Strange Case of Wilhelm Reich•, 
charged that "'The man who blames both neuroses and cancer 
on unsatisfactory sexual activities has been repudiated by 
only one scientific journal.'"29 
By the end of 1948 it became obvious that a concerted 
effort was being made by the American Psychiatric 
Association against the spreading of psychiatric orgone 
therapy. Several psychiatrists who had been trained by 
Reich and had begun to practice p:;ychiatric orgone therapy 
were dismissed from the staffs of hospitals where they 
worked after they refused to give up a theraJ:¥ which they 
thought beneficial to their patients. others were denied 
promotions in professional associations. still others, in 
private practice, were approached by the A.P.A. and advised 
to sever their connection with Reich. All these men, 
graduates of rredical schools of high standing and respected 
members of professional organizations, had come to find in 
orgone theraJ:¥ a better way of helping their patients - and 
on that basis preferred to sever their connection with the 
established medical associations rather than with Reich. 
Reports came to the Orgone Institute that in lectures and 
courses given by merrbers of the American Psychiatric 
Association and the New York Psychiatric Association 
derogatory remarks about Reich and orgone theraJ:¥ crept in 
again and again; and rumors made the rounds that Reich was 
in a mental hospital.30 
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In February, 1954, the Food and Drug Administration brought 
an injunction against marketing the orgone accumulators, 
charging that they were being claimed fraudulently to cure 
cancer. Reich promptly defied the ban, and was tried and 
convicted for contempt in 1956. Despite improprieties and 
contradictions in the government's case, and his obvious 
poor health, Reich argued in his defense only that the 
government had no jurisdiction over basic issues of science, 
and that he was the victim of a Red Fascist conspiracy in 
particular, and the emotional plague in general. With no 
defense made to the specific charge of criminal contempt, 
Judge George Sweeney reluctantly sentenced Reich May 3, 
1956, to two years in prison. In August, federal agents 
destroyed the orgone boxes in Reich's possession, and burned 
his books and papers. Reich died in his sleep November 3, 
1957 in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERATION AND FIELD OF DISCOURSE 
Thus far, I have 
analogous contradictions 
attempted to understand certain 
in Reich's life and the text of 
Character Analysis - failures of memory, erotic moments, an 
eccentric science - as manifested formally and signifying 
liberation. I want to proceed to a comparable problem. 
This is the relationship of the book to its social context, 
to the special sense of the world experienced by Reich and 
his generation. This a correspondence between the 
authoritarian tendencies of German and Austrian society and 
culture during the imperial and interwar period, and a 
central concept of Reich's - the genital character type. 
The interpenetration of milieu and text appears as the 
attempt to objectify reason in nature. And again, the 
writing itself signifies a basic motive to overcome habits 
of domination and affirm freedom and tolerance. This is 
evident formally in Reich's use of identity statements. My 
discussion proceeds from a description of some common 
psychological and social experiences shared by Reich and 
other Central Europeans of his era, to some common cultural 
values, and to some common characteristics of anti-fascist 
psychoanalytic writing. 
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Peter Loewenberg's concept of the youth cohort is 
useful in delineating some attributes of Reich's generation 
- of the social, intellectual, and psychological climate 
within which Character Analysis was written. He defines a 
cohort as 
The aggregate of individuals within a population who have 
shared a significant conrnon experience of a personal or 
historical event at the same time.I 
Each individual carries the effects of this significant 
experience for his or her entire life. Loewenberg bases his 
analysis of twentieth century German political attitudes on 
the childhood insecurities suffered by those youth who were 
aged eighteen to thirty in 1933, who were born and raised 
during the First World war, and who represented nearly half 
the membership of the Nazi Party, the party's "first 
breakthrough into the masses."2 
Corrmon experiences in childhood, in psychosexual 
developnent, and in political socialization • • • led to 
similar fixations and distortions of adult character. The 
specific factors that conditioned this generation include 
the prolonged absence of the parents, the return of the 
father in defeat, extreme hunger and privation, and a 
national defeat in war, which meant the loss of the 
prevailing political authority and left no viable 
replacement with which to identify.3 
The consequences of these pressures included a tendency 
"toward violent, aggressive, 'acting out' behavior", and 
toward "the devices of splitting and projection - the good 
and the bad upon whom one can gratify aggressive 
feelings.•4 
The i;sychological symptoms of regression to phases of ego 
functioning "fixed" by the trawnata of a childhood in war 
included responding to internal personal stress with 
externalized violence, projecting all negative anti-
national or anti-social qualities onto foreign and ethnic 
individuals and groups, and meeting frustrations that would 
otherwise be tolerated with patience and rationally 
ai;:proa.ched for solutions with a necessity for inmediate 
gratification. The political expression of weakened egos 
and superegos that fostered regression was man if est not 
only in turning to violence but most especially in the 
longing for a glorified and idealized but distant father 
who is all-knowing and all-p<:Merful, who preaches military 
virtues and permits his sons and daughters to identify with 
him by wearing a uniform and joining conbat in a national 
cause.5 
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Reich and many of his patients, of course, were born into 
the generation previous to this. But his own cohort shared 
similar economic stresses, especially those caused by the 
mass movement of people from Eastern and Southern Europe 
into the ind us trial cities of Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
Reich was exposed to the psychological pressures of the war 
as a combat officer and to the after-effects of the German 
Revolution of 1918 as a Communist Party organizer. And, as 
we have seen, he suffered severely the trauma of parental 
loss. So Loewenberg's concept of generation helps 
illuminate not only the climate of thought and experience, 
but also the individual sensibility, which inform the text. 
The concept of national character is similarly useful. 
In an anthropological study of Germans who survived World 
war Two, David Rodnick delineates a number of significant 
traits, indicating a basic pattern of submissiveness, 
obedience, insecurity, and yearning for community. 
[A] dependence upon others for affection is present 
throughout German society and may well arise from the 
extremely warm and submissive relation of parents in German 
family life. The experiences of most Germans after the 
adolescent years tend to negate this pattern, but the 
desire for affection remains. The insecure world of the 
adult, where personal goals are difficult to realize, where 
hopes can be easily shattered, where social status can be 
tenuous, and hostility is met far more often than 
friendliness, makes the German feel that he must not show 
any softness but be hard toward his fellow man. In a world 
where, at a cost to his own ego, he must constantly defer 
to individuals above him in social status, he rarely feels 
personally secure. He learns to conform to the prevalent 
patterns because he will be punished if he does not, but 
underneath there is a desire to feel that he has not fear 
but liking for those above him, and that they in turn like 
him.6 
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German children were shown constant affection by both 
parents from infancy; until the age of three ~hey were held 
by their mothers for much of their waking hours. Their 
physical needs were completely ministered to. warmth and 
security extended to these children's entire experience. 
Even strangers are brought into the world of intimacy 
surrounding the child as "uncles" and "aunts", and the 
child is encouraged to look upon everyone who enters the 
family circle as being friendly toward him.7 
In addition, discipline was stressed. "Among all classes, 
toilet training begins when the infant is about five months 
old."8 German children learn politeness, cooperativeness, a 
regard for others, and egalitarianism within the family 
environment. The contradictions to adult experience - of 
status preoccupations, economic struggle, and alienated 
affections - became mediated by strong class consciousness 
and intense friendships formed in adolescence. 
The German adolescent feels a strong bond between himself 
and others of his age. He would like to see a society 
developed exclusively for adolescents to protect them 
against the difficulties of living in a world controlled by 
their elders who make no provision for the youth to replace 
them through assistance, guidance, and gradual self-
effacement. 9 
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And it was compensated in part by early sexual experience. 
Middle class boys were generally sexually active by the age 
of fourteen, usually with prostitutes or servants. 
Proletarian youths tended to remain innocent longer, unable 
to obtain prostitutes until they became wage-earners, 
usually at age seventeen. Early engagements and pre-marital 
sex were common; girls were expected to provide sexual 
favors in exchange for the companionship of boys. Orgasm 
and sexual satisfaction among middle class women were rare. 
Although marriages were generally life-long arrangements, 
about half of bourgeois German men continued to have 
mistresses or frequent prostitutes. This was not 
economically possible for working men, who tended to be less 
impotent and more affectionate with their wives. These 
patterns of unfulfilling sexual arrangements and of 
submission to authority in family life recall Reich's own 
childhood experiences and point to his condemnation of the 
wide-ranging consequences of patriarchy and repression. 
The experiences of adolescents cannot be 
overemphasized as factors in the creation of German culture 
and society during Reich's period which was marked 
politically by the development of mass organizations outside 
of traditional parties, and generally by strong 
authoritarian, communal, and erotic features. This is most 
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notably evident in the impact of the youth movement in 
Germany and Austria during the decades from 1890 and 1930. 
Reich himself joined an Alpine club during his student 
years in Vienna. And certain features of the Volkish 
movement are reflected in his work. A significant one is 
the emphasis placed on liberating activity. Walter Laqueur, 
in his study of Young Germany, recalls 
"Nobody but the Gennan knows in which direction he is 
moving." When I first read those words [of Martin Voelkel, 
a youth leader], If!Y memory was taken back to something that 
had ha:f.Pened to me in 1934. I was visiting one of the 
brand new Gennan labour camps at Rendsburg in Schleswig-
Holstein, in an attempt to understand the Hitler Youth. 
That evening, in the youth hostel, we got into a fierce 
argument and I accused the Nazis of leading Europe to 
destruction. At this point, If!Y oi;:ponent, a handsome, 
uniformed blond, drew himself up and shouted, "At least 
Gernany is leading and you are dragging along behind."10 
Besides its nationalism, certainly the most evident 
characteristic of Volkish thinking is its faith in the 
transformative power of action - in and of itself - over the 
future. It is a utopian mode of thought, based on a 
yearning to negate the present and open up time for the 
emergence of potentiality and authenticity. In this 
conviction, the youth movement voiced an "unpolitical 
protest against bourgeois civilization's lack of vitality, 
warmth, emotion, and ideals. nll Equally characteristic was 
its emphasis on leadership. This was understood as a 
natural, sexual quality, with physical beauty and grace its 
emblems. An important experience in many of these groups 
was ecstatic surrender - often to music and dance, or to the 
76 
erotic appeal of the group leader. Protests against sexual 
repression were often found in their programs. 
These attitudes found their most significant 
historical expression in those undercurrents of Weimar 
society which apotheosized war, which valued leadership, 
action, and erotically charged physical courage and grace as 
absolutes. The German army toward the end of World War One 
recruited and promoted from the ranks an enormous number of 
officers of a special type, young, unmarried, often former 
athletes, and without regard to class background. Trained 
to function in a horrifying war, commissioned, and given 
status counter to traditional social constraints, these men 
became after the armistice the leaders of a mass of 
"fighters who could not be debrutalized. nl2 An estimated 
200,000 to 400,000 veterans, ruthless, arrogant, and without 
attachments, joined the Free Corps, the private armies used 
against the Spartacus Uprising and the chronically unstable 
Weimar Rupblic. In the words of the writer Ernst von 
Salomon: 
The war could not release them from its grip ••• The most 
active part of the Front marched simply because it had 
learned to march. It marched through the cities enveloped 
in a cloud of sullen rage - a cloud of vaulting, 
purix>seless fury - knowing that now it had to fight, to 
fight at any cost ••• This then was the one problem of the 
Free Corp:; fighter: to give his utmost so that the real 
meaning of ;11 war could be made manifest to the very limit 
of his power. 3 
As a social, psychological, and cultural force, the German 
war veterans resemble the Volkish youth in their critical 
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attitude toward bourgeois liberalism and they resemble Reich 
in their valuing of an activity beyond words and thought as 
a form of liberation. Again, in von Salomon's words: 
we were cut off from the world of burqerlich norms ••• The 
bonds were broken and we were free. The blood surging 
through our veins was full of a wild demand for revenge and 
adventure and danger... We were a band of fighters drunk 
with all the passions of the world; full of lust, exultant 
in action. What we wanted, we did not know. And what we 
knew, we did not want! War and adventure, excitement and 
destruction. An indefinable, surging force welled up from 
every part of our being and flayed us onward.14 
This pure resentment, at base obj ectless, exemplifies the 
wellspring of psychological projection that pervaded Reich's 
ego. Social pressures, individual insensitivities, and 
emerging erotic desires all combined to form a typical mode 
of thinking. It characteristically confused rebellious 
yearnings with habits of sadistic domination. This seems to 
me similar to what we have seen as a significant 
contradiction in Reich's own life and work. 
These aspects of Central European society and culture 
in general - insecurity, tendencies toward domination and 
projection, the eroticization of political issues - recall 
more than contradictions and characteristics of Character 
Analysis. A struggle toward consciousness of these same 
issues is typical of a special realm of discourse - the 
psychoanalytic critique of fascism. Reich's historical 
reputation to a large extent derives from his own pioneering 
work - and Character Analysis is illuminated by its place -
in this tradition. I want to proceed to describe a number 
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of these important writings in the hope they might point up 
the relative historical significance of Reich's 
contradictory tendencies toward liberation and domination. 
Perhaps the most widely known work in this tradition 
is Erich Fromm's Escape ..f.LQm Freedom. Fromm attempts to 
define a historically important feature, a typology of the 
character structure of the masses. This is only in some 
respects similar to Reich's. It is independent of any 
theory of material instincts. The most significant neurotic 
type for both writers is the sadomasochist. But Fromm 
emphasizes ego conflict rather than sexuality. 
The difference between the perversion and masochistic 
character traits lies essentially in the following: In the 
perversion the trend to get rid of one's self is expressed 
through the medium of the body and linked up with sexual 
feelings. While in moral masochism, the masochistic trends 
get hold of the whole person and tend to destroy all the 
aims which the ego consciously tries to achieve; in the 
perversim the masochistic strivings are more or less 
restricted to the physical realm; moreover by their 
amalgamation with sex they participate in the release of 
tension occurring in the sexual sphere and thus find some 
direct release. 
The annihilation of the individual self and the 
attempt to overcane thereby the unbearable feeling of 
powerlessness are only one side of the masochistic 
strivings. The other side is the attempt to become part of 
a bigger and more powerful whole outside of oneself, to 
submerge and participate in it. This power can be a 
person, an institution, God, the nation, conscience, or a 
psychic cornµilsion. By becoodng part of a power which is 
felt as unshakably strong, eternal, and glamorous, one 
participates in its strength and glory. One surrenders 
one's own self and renounces all strength and pride 
cormected with it, one loses one's integrity as an 
individual and surrenders freedan; but one gains a new 
security and a new pride in the participation in the power 
in which one sul:merges.15 
Fromm also opposes the neurotic to an ethically normative, 
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rational, free personality type similar to Reich's genital 
character. 
With regard to single ccncepts we have shown that to the 
sado-masochistic character, for example, love means 
syrrbiotic dependence, not mutual affirmation and union on 
the basis of equality; sacrifice means the utmost 
subordination of the individual self to something higher, 
not assertion of one's mental and moral self; difference 
means difference in power, not the realization of 
individuality on the basis of equality; justice means 
everybody should get what he deserves, not that the 
individual has an unconditional claim to the realization of 
inherent and inalienable rights; courage is the readiness 
to submit and endure suffering, not the utmost assertion of 
individuality against power.16 
Fromm, however, makes a very broad historical and social 
analysis on the basis of an unmediated analogy to clinical 
findings. 
The physiologically conditioned needs are not the only 
imperative part of man's nature. There is another part 
just as co~lling, one which is not rooted in bodily 
processes, but in the very essence of the human mode and 
practise of life: the need to be related to the world 
outside oneself, the need to avoid aloneness.17 
There is a certain advantage to this. Evidence of social 
unreason and domination need not be tied to actual emotional 
disorders nor their physiological aetiologies. Consequently 
fascist tendencies can be predicated or explained of any 
group or individual impressionistically. There is also a 
certain problem. Critique loses the force of a natural 
necessity, and becomes a transparent projection of purely 
personal concerns. This is true of Fromm's history-making 
in Escape from Freedom, his identification of fascism with 
the Protestant Reformation as a class response to crisis, 
insecurity, and change. 
Thereby the new religious doctrines not only gave 
expression to what the average rnenber of the middle class 
felt, but, by rationalizing and systematizing this 
attitlde, they also increased and strengthened it. 
However, they did more than that; they also showed the 
individual a way to cope with his anxiety. They taught him 
that by fully accepting his pcMerlessness and the evilness 
of his nature, by considering his whole life an atonement 
for his sins, by the utrrost self-humiliation, and also by 
unceasing effort, he could be loved by God and could at 
least hope to belong to those whan God had decided to save. 
Protestantism was the answer to the human needs of the 
frightened, uprooted, and isolated individual who had to 
orient and to relate himself to a new world. 'I.be new 
character structure, resulting from economic and social 
changes and intensified by religious doctrines, became in 
its turn an important factor in shaping the further social 
and economic developnent.18 
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However suggestive this might be as an historical insight, 
it is undetermined by any empirical constraints. 
Protestantism doubtlessly was also the very human response 
of the strong, self-assured, secure, flexible, and loving to 
their historical situation of ~enital as well as 
sadomasochistic characters and informed social 
institutions typified by freedom as well as economic 
discipline. So at times Escape from Freedom seems itself an 
exercise in intolerance - and certainly subject to the same 
strains and contradictions as Reich's work. 
G. M. Gilbert, in ~ Psychology of Dictatorship, 
explains fascism as an interaction of the individual 
psychosexual characteristics of its leadership with social 
stresses and cultural norms. Unlike Fromm, he relies on 
clinical evidence prison interviews and psychological 
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tests of Goering, Hess, Frank, Ribbentrop, and Hoess. Of 
course, this was not an ideal therapeutic situation; Gilbert 
did not face his subjects with the sympathy of the physician 
seeking an understanding that comes with cure, but as an 
interlocutor assuming criminal guilt. And his analysis of 
Hitler had to be secondhand. But he is careful with the 
complex mediations between individual personality and 
historical events. 
This confusion of values and i;:uq:x>ses at the very outset of 
the National Socialist movement was largely determined by 
the multiplicity of Hitler's aggressive needs and 
ant:>ivalent group identifications. It also accounted for 
the extreme variety of personalities and motives among the 
followers, rendering any categorical judrts on the 
character of the Nazis extremely unreliable. 9 
Gilbert understands psychopathic leadership as a type of 
response to real social contradictions. For example, he 
notes a characterological symptom of Hitler which is 
reminiscent of Reich's discussion. His relationships with 
women were supposedly abnormal. Al though there is no good 
evidence to believe that he committed sexual perversions, he 
showed an "inhibited and strained... inordinate pol! teness 
and show of gallantry." 
[He] would kiss the hand of an ordinary unmarried girl, 
ina:rpropriately imitating the gesture reserved for Junkers' 
and ministers' wives.20 
This quirk was the trivial acting out of a profound class 
contradiction, a subtle aggression, and an impropriety that 
reflected a yearning for class reconciliation in the midst 
of extreme differences of status. A similar dynamic was at 
work in Rudolf Hess. 
The palpable psychopathology in Hess I case aweared to be 
directly related to [a] conflict of social values. Though 
it undoubtedly had its roots in his early emotional 
developnent, the breakdown into outright hysterical and 
paranoid symptoms was precipitated by social conflict: the 
incompatibility of humanitarian ideals and aggressive 
ethnocentricity.21 
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Perhaps Gilbert's most striking evidence comes from Rudolf 
Hoess, commander of the extermination camps. Hoess 
exhibited an unusual poverty of affect; sex played almost no 
part in his life, he showed no passion toward his wife, and 
never masturbated nor felt the desire to. Hoess' 
distraction matched his historical role. 
The five years of solitary confinement in Dachau virtually 
canpleted the withdrawal process. By the time he became 
"desensitized" to the task of extermination, he was a 
walking inhuman rd::>ot, utterly devoid of human empathy, yet 
functioning intellectually on a high level of mechanical 
efficiency.22 
Gilbert's point is that social and cultural contradictions 
fed a monstrously criminal political activity, because of 
their extreme demands on normal psychological adaption 
functions. It is a point that surprisingly seems to extend 
sympathy and understanding even to fascists as bound in 
ahead of social, psychological, and historical fact. 
Erik H. Erikson, in "Wholeness and Totality - a 
Psychiatric Contribution" to Carl J. Friedrich's symposium 
on totalitarianism, approaches the problem of fascism with 
still stronger therapeutic empathy. 
I begin with the assumption that totalitarianism is based 
on universal human potentialities and is thus related to 
all aspects of human nature, wholesome and pathological, 
adult and infantile, individual and societal. 
Totalitarianism has often been a near reality: it has 
merely waited for "its" historical rooment.... Only such 
historical perspective can give the proper measure of the 
different degrees and kinds of ideological involvement on 
the part of the many types that make up a totalitarian 
state: fanatic apostles and the shrewd revolutionaries; 
lonely leaders and oligarchic cliques; obedient 
bureaucrats and efficient managers, soldiers, and 
engineers; sincere believers and sadistic exploiters; 
willing followers, apathetic toilers, and paralyzed 
OH;>Onents; unnerved victims and bewildered would-be 
and could-be victims.23 
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Fascism as a historical moment is possible because it draws 
on typical experiences in individual development. The 
normal healthy alternation between various given poles of 
living and feeling - Erikson mentions an infant's happy 
pattern of waking and sleeping as an example - gives way at 
critical times in any human life to what Erikson calls total 
realignments. 
Violent loves and hates and sudden conversions and 
aversions share with the child's fetishism and fears such 
factors as the exclusive focusing of a set of (friendly or 
unfriendly) affects on one person or idea; the 
primitivization of all affects thus focused; and a utopian 
(or cataclysmic) expectation of a total gain or a total 
loss to come from this focus ••• 
While such realigrunents may seem to appear suddenly, 
they develop slowly. Only unconmonly aware and brave 
people know about themselves what psychoanalysis reveals in 
others, and particularly patients - namely, how strong and 
systematic are man• s proclivities gng potentialities .fQr. 
total realigmneots, often barely hidden behind one-sided 
predilections and convictions, and how much energy is 
enployed in inner defenses against a threatening total 
reorientation in which black may turn into white and vice 
versa •••• At any rate, we have learned to understand such 
realignments as readjustments on a more primitive level, 
made necessary by increased anxieties, especially of 
infantile origin, and called forth by acute life crises.24 
Perhaps the most common of these totalistic adjustments is 
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the experience of romantic love, the selection of a single 
object as the focus of all affect and self-identification. 
The origin of these experiences is the infant's total 
dependence on its mother and the total rage it can suffer in 
moments of powerless, frustrated impoverishment. Periods of 
radical social change can throw an entire society, and 
especially its youth, back to a condition within which this 
rage predominates. 
Where historical and technological develoµnents severely 
encroach upon deeply rooted or strongly emerging identites 
(i.e., agrarian, feudal, patrician) on a large scale, youth 
feels endangered, individually and collectively, whereupon 
it becomes ready to support doctrines offering a total 
imnersion in a synthetic identity (extreme nationalism, 
racism, or class consciousness) and a collective 
condemnation of a totally stereotyped enemy of the new 
identity. '!be fear of loss of identity which fosters such 
indoctrination contributes significantly to that mixture of 
righteousness and criminality which, under totalitarian 
conditions, becomes available for organized terror and for 
the establishnent of major industries of extermination. 
Since conditions undermining a sense of identity also 
fixate older individuals on adolescent alternatives, a 
great nurrber of adults fall in line or are paralyzed in 
their resistance.25 
Erikson opposes the experience of totality with what he 
names wholeness; this is another ego development norm, 
emphasizing flexibility and tolerance, and similar to 
Reich's genital character. 
There seems to be something like a movement from Fromm 
to Gilbert and Erikson of increasing sympathy for the human 
experience that makes the mass psychology of fascism 
possible. This is still clearer in Georges Bataille's "The 
Psychological Structure of Fascism." Bataille proposes a 
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typology of social existence defined by the categories of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous. Homogeneous society is 
useful, productive, rational; it is one of concrete cash and 
legal relationships, continuities, smooth, and 
interchangeable. •In the contemporary period, social 
homogeneity is linked to the bourgeois class by essential 
ties. •26 The heterogeneous is, on the other hand, related 
to the unconscious and the masses. Its characteristics 
include disruptions, shocks, "violence, excess, delirium, 
madness", despair, and revulsion.27 
The nauseating forms of dejection provoke a feeling of 
disgust so unbearable that it is improper to express or 
even to make allusion to it. By all indications, in the 
psychological order of disfiguration, the material poverty 
of man has excessive consequences.28 
It is a manifestation of affect. 
It presents itself as a charge, as a value, passing from 
one object to another in a more or less abstract fashion, 
almost as if the change were taking place not in t~ world 
of objects but only in the judgments of the subject. 9 
It is the realm of the sacred, the erotic, of poverty, and 
filth. The two categories are mediated historically in 
kingship, which represents both the rational, regular 
activities of the state, and the irrational attributes of 
domination, absolute freedom, and war-making. Fascism is a 
peculiar modern form of kingship, in which the leader 
partakes of "assuming in complete freedom the imperative 
character of action", as well as the sacred qualities of 
nature and the nation. 30 This is the basis of its appeal, 
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its affective connection to the masses. However, fascist 
domination remains unstable, ironically, because of its 
homogeneous elements; its political authority continues to 
depend on administrative, juridical, and economic 
functions. Bataille characterizes fascism as an incomplete 
exploitation of heterogeneous aspirations. 
Thus the upper part of the heterogeneous region is both 
inmobilized and inmobilizing, and only the lower part 
formed by the impoverished and oppressed classes is capable 
of entering into movement. But, for the latter, passive 
and oppressed by definitioo, the fact of entering into 
movement represents a profound alteration of their nature: 
in order to take part in a struggle against the sovereign 
agency and the legal oomogeneity oppressing them, the lower 
classes must pass from a passive and diffuse state to a 
form of conscious activity; in Marxist terms, these classes 
must become aware of themselves as a revolutionary 
proletariat. This proletariat cannot actually be limited 
to itself: it is in fact only a point of ccncentration for 
every dissociated social element that has been banished to 
heterogeneity. It is even possible to say that such a 
point of concentration exists in a sense prior to the 
formation of what must be called the "conscious 
proletariat n: the general descriptioo of the 
heterogeneous region actually implies that it be posited as 
a ccnstitutive element of the structure of a whole that 
includes not only imperative forms and impoverished forms 
but also Subversive forms.31 
In other words, the intuitions, the drives, the affects that 
erupt in fascism are not so much pathologies as subversive, 
liberating powers. 
An organized understanding of the movements in society, of 
attraction and reµilsion, starkly presents itself as a 
weapon - at this moment when a vast coovulsioo opposes, not 
so much fascism to conmunism, but radical imperative forms 
to the deep subversioo which continues to pursue the 
emancipation of htnnan lives.32 
The work of Max Horkheimer in effect extends this 
sympathy by means of a thoroughgoing radical critique of all 
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current social relations as essentially fascist - as moments 
of domination. These include the concepts of reason, 
character development and youth, sexuality and the family, 
and the touchstone of fascist domination, racism. For 
example, in Eclipse .Q.f Reason, he argues that the very 
concept of rationality in western philosophy has become 
purely instrumental, divorced from moral decisions and 
absolute values, and harnessed to economic production, 
class, authority, and the destruction of nature. 
Having given up autonaJ¥, reasoo has becane an instrument. 
In the formalistic aspect of subjective reason, stressed by 
positivism, its unrelatedness to objective content is 
emphasized; in its instnnnental aspect, stressed by 
pragmatism, its surrender to heteronomous contents is 
emphasized. Reason has becane canpletely harnessed to the 
social process. Its operational value, its role in the 
domination of men and nature, has been made the sole 
criterion.... NEY use transcending auxiliary, technical 
sUIIIIlarization of factual data has been eliminated as a last 
trace of superstition. Concepts have becane "streamlined", 
rationalized, labor-saving devices. It is as if thinking 
itself had been reduced to the level of industrial 
processes, subjected to a close schedule - in short, made 
part and parcel of production.33 
This subjugation of reason signals for Horkheimer something 
more than a problem in the history of ~pistemology; rather, 
it adduces a historical system of class relationships which 
function uniformly as a totality. Its class character 
reveals how reason is compromised as a mere tool of 
domination. 
Insight, for example, may be an important factor in the 
develqment and continuance of society; it may even be the 
inmediate ground of socialization, as many theories of 
Enlightenment times or a psych:>logist like Freud claims. 
Yet the whole psychic ag>aratus of rnerrbers of a class 
society, in so far as they do not belong to the nucleus of 
privileged people, serves in large measure only to 
interiorize or at least to rationalize and supplement 
physical coercion. The so-called "social nature" of man, 
his self-integration into a given order of things, whether 
the ground of this order be pragmatic, moral, or 
religious, is essentially reducible to the memory of the 
acts of force by which men were made "sociable" and 
civilized and which threaten them still if they become too 
forgetful.34 
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It also reveals the knot of contradictions that make fascist 
responses the typical human experience. For example, the 
rage and hatred of civilization typical of a fascist youth 
is not simply an irrational projection. It is more an 
unsuccessful but understandable attempt to overcome "the 
renunciation of instinctual urges expected from him.n35 
Adolescent revolt is based on the intuition of the wrongness 
of class relationships. 
What fills the adolescent with distress is, above all, his 
dim and confused realization of the close connection or 
near-identity of reason, self, domination, and nature. He 
feels the gap between the ideals taught to him and the 
expectations that they arouse in him oo the one hand, and 
the reality principle to which he is corcq;>elled to submit on 
the other. His ensuing rebellion is directed against the 
circumstance that the air of godliness, of aloofness from 
nature, of infinite superiority, conceals the rule of the 
stronger or of the smarter.36 
The young have two options in their self-creation of 
character: either a life of loneliness and confrontation, 
the inevitable consequences of their expressions of truth 
and passion; or one of submission. Mass acquiescence to 
authority gravitates between these two poles of ultimately 
meaningless aggression and reconciliation, both of which are 
merely forms of self-obliteration. In this scheme, race 
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murder demonstrates in its purest form the frustration of 
affect, domination, and the absurdity of class. 
The rights of man were designed to promise happiness even 
to those without power. Because the cheated masses feel 
that this promise in general remains a lie as long as there 
are still classes, their anger is aroused. They feel 
mocked. They must suppress the very possibility and idea 
of that happiness, the more relevant it becomes. Wherever 
it seems to have been achieved despite its fundamental 
denial, they have to repeat the suppression of their own 
longing. Everything which gives occasion for such 
repetition, however unha:fPY it may be in itself - Anasver 
or Mignon, alien things which are reminders of the promised 
land, or beauty which recalls sex, or the proscribed animal 
which is reminiscent of prorniscui ty - draws upon itself 
that destructive lust of civilized men who could never 
fulfill the process of civilization. Those who 
spasroodically daninate nature see in a tormented nature a 
provocative image of powerless hawiness. The thought of 
hawiness without }?Q'fier is unbearable because it would then 
be true hawiness. 37 
To conclude this review of the intellectual context of 
Character Analysis, I am going to note some aspects of 
Herbert Marcuse's work of the 1930's and 1940's. Like 
Horkheimer, he views fascism as a general consequence of 
social class, as a totality which nevertheless signals 
possibilities for liberation. He links liberation with 
absolute ethical values and non-instrumental reason. 
A theory of society is rationalist when the practice it 
enjoins is subject to the idea of autonomous reason, i.e. 
to the human faculty of canprehending, through conceptual 
thought, the true, the good, and the right. Within 
society, every action and every determination of goals as 
well as the social organization as a whole has to 
legitimate itself before the decisive judgment of reason 
and everything, in order to subsist as a fact or goal, 
stands in need of rational justification.38 
Bourgeois ideology, by abandoning autonomous reason and 
viewing human freedom as exercised in individual market 
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decisions and their aggregate as natural mechanisms, 
prepares the ideational basis for fascism. 
Through this privatization .Qf. reason, the construction of 
society in accordance with reason is deprived of the end 
which is supposed to provide its goal (just as in 
irrationalisrn it is deprived of its begirming through the 
functionalization of reason). Thus, precisely the rational 
determination and condition of that "generality" in which 
the "ha:winess" of the individual is supposed to be 
realized is missing. To this extent and only to this 
extent) the reproach that liberalism's talk of general 
interest or humanity remains caught in µire abstractions is 
correct. The structure and order of the whole are 
ultimately left to irrational forces: an accidental 
"harmony", a "natural balance." The plausibility of 
liberalist rationalism thus ceases innnediately when, with 
the intensification of social conflict and economic crises, 
general "harmony" becomes increasingly improbable. At this 
point liberalist theory must grasp at irrational 
justifications. Rational critique gives up; it is all too 
readily prepared to acknowledge "natural" privileges and 
favors. The idea of the charismatic, authoritarian leader 
is already preformed in the liberalist celebration of the 
gifted economic leader, the "born" executive.39 
As an alternative to instrumental reason, Marcuse attempts 
to revive the concept of a human essence as constructive of 
true rationality. This is a complex of historical memory, 
composed of suffering, domination, and violence, future 
potentiality, understood as the possibilities for freedom 
and happiness under the advanced productive capabilities 
which capitalism suppresses, and the opportunities of 
activity in the present, which both redeem the past and 
create the future. The most significant activity for 
Marcuse is sexual. It opposes the habits of renunciation 
imposed by bourgeois society, which Marc use names 
affirmative culture. 
By affirmative culture is meant that culture of the 
bourgeois epoch which led in the course of its own 
develcpnent to the segregation from civilization of the 
mental and spiritual world as an independent realm of value 
that is also considered superior to civilization. Its 
decisive characteristic is the assertion of a universally 
obligatory, eternally better and more valuable world that 
must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially 
different from the factual world of the daily struggle for 
existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself 
"from within", without any transformation of the state of 
fact. It is only in this culture that cultural activities 
and objects gain that value which elevates them above the 
everyday sphere. Their reception becomes an act of 
celebration and exaltation.40 
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Marc use proposes instead of this cul tu re of abstraction, 
privacy, and interiorization, a concrete, social, and 
sensuous one. In Marcuse' s critique, sexual happiness has 
an absolutely subversive nature. Class relationships can 
only endure as cold spirituality or incomplete, frustrated, 
empty forms of gratification. Capitalist society transforms 
sensual pleasure into a bad instrumentality, into the 
discipline of marriage, into procreation for pusposes of 
production, into forms of labor. 
The un?Jrified, unrationalized release of sexual 
relationships would be the strongest release of enjoyment 
as such and the total devaluation of labor for its own 
sake. No hl.llilan being could tolerate the tension between 
labor as valuable in itself and the freedom of enjoyment. 
The dreariness and injustice of work conditions would 
penetrate explosively the consciousness of individuals and 
make impossible their peaceful subordination to the social 
system of the bourgeois world.41 · 
I want to proceed now to examine Reich's formulation 
of the concept of the genital character in relation to all 
these contexts - to the tendency of his generation to act 
out and project aggression, to the erotic, authoritarian, 
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communal idealism of the youth movement, to the cultural 
values of natural forces and undifferentiated action, and to 
the psychoanalytic critique of fascism in terms of normative 
and autonomous ethics and liberating energies. Again, I 
want to suggest that whatever contradictory attitudes inform 
Reich's concept, basic motives of sympathy, freedom, and 
redemption are suggested by its historical situation and are 
signified by the formal qualities of Reich's writing. 
In this review so far, the genital character has 
referred to Reich's clinical discovery that his patients' 
histories of genital primacy in childhood were a 
precondition for cure; to his endeavors to enable his 
patients to express themselves biologically, authentically, 
from the core of their being, in the autonomic undulations 
of orgasm; and to his typology of the character is tics of 
plague-ridden versus healthy individuals. Let me cite one 
last elaboration of the concept: 
The genital character has a solid narcissistic foundation. 
In the neurotic character, on the other hand, the feeling 
of irnpotence forces the ego to make compensations of a 
narcissistic nature. The ccnternporary ccnflicts, permeated 
with irrational motives, make it impossible for the 
neurotic character to reach rational decisions •••• 
Sexually unsatisfied and incapable of being 
satisfied, the neurotic character is finally forced either 
into asceticism or into rigid monogamy •••• 
Upon brief reflecticn, we see that the eIIq?irical 
discovery of the above mechanisms becomes the basis for a 
revoluticnary critique of all theoretically based systems 
of morals. • • • we can briefly state that to the extent that 
society makes possible the gratification of needs and the 
transforrnaticn of the corresponding human structures, the 
mora1 regulaticn of social life will fall away. • • • More 
simply expressed, what this all means is that the man whose 
sexual as well as primitive biological and cultural needs 
are satisfied does not require any morality to maintain 
self-control. But the unsatisfied man, suppressed in all 
respects, suffers from mounting inner excitation that would 
cause him to tear everything to pieces if his energy were 
not partially held in check and partially consumed by 
moralistic inhibitions •••• 
The discussion of the broader consequences of sex-
ecOJlOOri and the analytic theory of character will not be 
able to evade these questions unless, at the sacrifice of 
its natural scientific prestige, it prefers to pull in the 
reins at the artificially erected boundary between what is 
and what should be.42 
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Noteworthy, here, is the series of identity statements 
and implications. These include linking impotence with the 
inability nto reach rational decisions" 1 sadism and 
destructive urges with monogamy and morals1 nthe 
gratification of needs" and sexuality with social change and 
destruction of the state1 nature with goodness1 and the 
integrity of science with the utopian future. What this 
signifies is Reich's transformation and integration of a 
number of dominant cultural attitudes. Although built on 
clinical evidence, the statements do not represent anything 
like empirical proof. The implication that monogamy and 
abstinence mechanically produce irrationality might be true 
in certain case histories, but is absurd in general. 
Indeed, the suggestion seems authoritarian, an ironic abuse 
of sexual freedom, a peculiar projection, a lack of 
tolerance for individual wants, needs, and options. His 
demand that moral judgment be replaced by behavior regulated 
by sexual drives might appear an extreme mystification, 
similar to Volkish appeals to nature and activism. But 
94 
considered in the context of other psychosexual critiques of 
politics, a different meaning emerges. It is clear that 
Reich's statements derive from an utopian identity of nature 
and reason, the human body and social instincts. Reich has 
found in his clinical experience hints that autonomous 
reason is validated in the complementary autonomous 
processes of nature and desire. These identities represent 
an overcoming of the irrational, dominating aspects of his 
milieu, in a linkage of nature and science to a transcendent 
reason and goodness. 
A brief look at the context of Reich's total oeuvre, 
at ~ ~ Psychology .Q.f Fascism, for example - originally 
published in 1933 like Character Analysis, and also revised 
and enlarged into the 1940's - makes clear that these 
impulses toward freedom are not only formal ones, locked 
inside Reich's language or mode of argument. Reich is often 
the most powerful, clear, didactic champion of the broadest 
conception of freedom. ~ .Mg_§_§ Psychology is less a 
clinical work and more a sociological one. Consequently, 
Reich gives his basic political direction its clearest 
statement here. ~ .Mg§§ Psychology also presents the 
reader with a series of identity statements. They are not 
merely formal significations of liberation, but powerful 
didactic ones, convincing images of a real, material 
liberating activity. 
Reich begins with a statistical identity between the 
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German lower middle class and the electoral support for 
Hitler. He balances this with a consideration reminiscent 
of Bataille - that there are •not only regressive but also 
very energetic progressive social forces in the 
rebelliousness of the lower middle classes.• (page 6). 
Reich suggests this two-sidedness is in the nature of 
consciousness. Formed in childhood, it consequently lags 
behind immediate needs, it is a conservative force; it 
includes an "ambivolant attitude toward authority 
rebellion against it coupled 
submission.•43 This formulation, 
Reich connects to a sociological 
patriarchal authoritarian family 
~ acceptance fillii 
similar to Gilbert's, 
identity between the 
and the authoritarian 
state. Sexual repression, bourgeois morality, the father's 
discipline, the compulsive 
masturbation and adolescent 
suppression 
love, all 
of childhood 
reproduce •an 
authoritarian social system in the structure of its 
members.•44 Sexual repression results both in the loss of 
self and self-confidence as well as sadistic habits of 
domination toward oneself and others - honor, duty, bravery, 
a whole pattern of violent renunciation. 
Reich proposes an identity relationship counter to 
this, and similar to Marcuse's, based on free sexual 
activity. •sexual desires naturally urge a person to enter 
into all kinds of relations with the world, to enter into 
close contact with it in a variety of forms.•45 These 
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subsume love, nature, and social immunity into a pattern of 
self-reflecting and self-generating acts of reason, 
pleasure, and freedom. For example, rational measures of 
reform •will result spontaneously, if only the basic 
principle .Qf sexual affirmation and the social protection 
of childhood and adolescent sexuality .!.§. adhered to.•46 In 
brief, •to define freedom is to define sexual health.n47 
Like Horkheimer, this habit of identity statements enables 
Reich at certain moments to express the most unequivocal 
demands for freedom. nwe wean the genuine freedom of 
personal and social development, the freedom to face life 
without fear, freedom from all forms of economic 
suppression, 
development; 
libido.•48 
freedom from reactionary inhibitions of 
in short, the free ~-administration .Q..f 
And in the end, this is a real identity of nature and 
human psychic life and activity authenticated by the most 
utopian demand. "If there should ever be a society in which 
all the cases for freed om fade away, then man will have 
finally overcome his biological and social deformity and 
have achieved genuine freedom. Not until man acknowledges 
that hs is fundamentally an animal, will he be able to 
create a genuine culture.•49 
This is again evidence of Reich's basic intention 
throughout his work to establish an absolute, thoroughgoing 
identification of nature and freedom. And I think it is 
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significant that here, again, Reich imagines this identity 
relationship as knowledge that resides in silence1 it is the 
soothing of all cries of discontent, the fulfillment in 
quiet of the final demand for liberation. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In this exercise I have attempted to derive historical 
meaning from a problematic text. Using the formal 
strategies of I. A. Richards and Roland Barthes, and the 
broadest sense of meaning elucidated in modern historical 
methodologies, I have related a personal reading of 
disjunctures in Character Analysis to the general struggle 
in this century to formulate a theory of liberation. 
Meaning emerges from the two-sided nature of Reich's work. 
Both his personal sympathies and the edges of his argument -
those formal indications of liberation which allow freedom 
of self-consciousness, discretion for the reader within the 
spaces created by contradictions - compete with the 
authoritarian tendencies of his age and of his own 
personality. ·In the end, the eccentricities of the text 
defy any movement toward restrictions, rules of proper 
discourse, potential for instrumental domination, that may 
be otherwise present in Reich's theory. This becomes 
clearest in Reich's concept of genital character, which is 
not so much a list of proper, restrictive traits, as a 
simple identity of human needs and nature, itself, as an 
autonomous goodness. 
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I began this essay by noting a tendency of historians 
to view their work as illuminated by the needs of the 
present. In conclusion, I want to mention a recent 
criticism of Reich's legacy. In ~ History Qf Sexuality, 
Michel Foucault explains why Reich's tactic of breaking 
through the knot of class contradictions with the weapon of 
sexual practices failed over the last half century. 
Thus between the two world wars there was formed, around 
Reich, the historico--political critique of sexual 
repression. The importance of this critique and its impact 
on reality were substantial. But the very possibility of 
its success was tied to the fact that it always unfolded 
within the deployment of sexuality, and not outside or 
against it. The fact that so many things were able to 
change in the sexual behavior of western societies without 
any of the promises or political conditions predicted by 
Reich being realized is sufficient proof that his whole 
sexual "revolution", this whole "anti-repressive" struggle, 
represented nothing more, but nothing less - and its 
importance is undeniable - than a tactical shift and 
reversal in the great develoµnent of sexuality. But it is 
also apparent why one could not expect this critique to be 
the grid for a history of that very develoµnent. Nor the 
basis for a movement to dismantle it.I 
Foucault seems to assert that the secret to crucial 
relationships of power lies not in the mysteries of the 
orgasm, but in the pleasures of language; that sexuality is 
not so much a matter of bodies - their functions and nature 
- as of ways of talking and imaging; that relationships and 
instruments of domination remain in discourse and 
dispersions of knowledge, irregardless of the quality of 
erotic practices. Reich, I believe, has the better 
argument. By linking the concept of liberation with an 
irreducible, non-discursive core of biologic experience, he 
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preserves its integrity as a total utopian demand. 
Sexuality becomes the domain of unified reason, nature, and 
potentiality. Reich's formulation, his language, is a sly 
suggestion, a promise unfulfilled; it represents a residue 
of desire which subverts any reconciliation to class 
formations by signifying a whole new world. 
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